January 18, 2012
Canadian Navy’s Holy of Holies – NATO Root Authority 9/11
We believe that Canadian Navy and Air Force electronic warfare and intelligence officers changed the public key used by a NATO Root Authority during a continuity of government exercise on 9/11 and thereby allowed ‘al-Qaeda' agents to destroy the Pentagon’s U.S. Navy Command Center which had just been upgraded by Amec (U.K.) to serve as America’s ‘Holy of Holies’ in the event of a nuclear war.
Public Key Infrastructure - News of the World Cutouts - Hidden Murder-For-Hire Services - Canary Wharf’s PKI - Matrix 5 Clients - Rebekah Brooks
Pattern of the Times:
CSIS missed Colonel Russell Williams and now Sub-Lieutenant Jeffrey Paul Delisle!!
Canadian Defence Minister Mackay’s Holy of Holies and the Honey Pot Wife
Canada changed NATO Root Authority on 9/11 and revoked the certificate needed by Captain Gerald Deconto, duty officer of the Pentagon’s U.S. Navy Command Center
Canadian Navy’s Holy of Holies in the Pentagon’s inner wall
“[NATO’s PKI] ….. A Public Key Infrastructure is a combination of policies, procedures, and computer hardware and software products providing a controlled framework for managing private and public key pairs. An effective Public Key Infrastructure is primarily focused on management rather than just the technology. A PKI also provides access to identifiers known as Public-Key Certificates. A Public-Key Certificate is an electronic data structure that binds an entity (e.g. user) to a public key. While public keys must be published and highly available, changes to the public encryption keys must not be allowed, otherwise an attacker could replace a recipient’s public key with his own. The sender would then mistakenly encrypt the message for the attacker instead of for the intended recipient. Many of the regulations, means, and infrastructure installations are established to protect the authenticity and integrity of the public keys. … Multifactor Authentication, Fraud Detection and Digital Certificate Solutions Entrust authentication security, fraud detection and digital certificate solutions form the foundation of well protected networks for organizations around the world. Concern over securing networks, protecting identities, detecting fraud and providing for file encryption has only escalated as the sophistication of cyber attacks has grown. Entrust provides robust cryptographic and identity solutions, digital certificates PKI, two factor authentication, fraud detection and user authentication products that deliver strong security and great value. PKI (or public key infrastructure) is well established as a security gold standard. A digital certificate issued from a PKI certification authority can be used for multiple security functions including strong user authentication, digital signatures and email encryption. Our security solutions arm network administrators with powerful authentication, fraud detection and encryption software to protect networks, safeguard data, and build consumer confidence in doing business online.”
“National Post: Decoding the case of alleged Canadian spy Jeffrey Paul Delisle
Kathryn Blaze Carlson Jan 18, 2012 – 12:38 AM ET | Last Updated: Jan 18, 2012 10:20 AM ET
In this occasional feature, the National Post tells you everything you need to know about a complicated issue. Today, Kathryn Blaze Carlson looks at the case of the Canadian navy intelligence officer accused this week of spying, reportedly for the Russians, since July 2007.
Q. What role did Sub-Lieutenant Jeffrey Paul Delisle play in Canada’s navy, and where did he work?
A. SLt. Delisle, whose bail hearing was put over on Tuesday until next week, is a junior intelligence officer at the Royal Canadian Navy’s Trinity centre in Halifax. Trinity is essentially a naval communications and intelligence centre where information from civilian and military sources is collected, analyzed and shared with allies such as the U.S. According to a July, 2009, statement from the navy, Canada and the U.S. agreed Canadian Forces and Coast Guard personnel would make “regular liaison visits” between the Trinity centre and the U.S.’s Maritime Intelligence Fusion Center Atlantic in Virginia Beach, Va. The statement said this would “promote the exchange of professional knowledge in operational matters.”
Q. What kind of information would SLt. Delisle have had access to?
A. As a navy intelligence officer, he would have received a Top Secret clearance, said Christian Leuprecht, associate professor of political science at the Royal Military College of Canada. He likely also received a NATO clearance called Cosmic Top Secret as well as what national security expert Wesley Wark called “Top Secret — Codeword,” which he said would have given the 40-year-old officer access to specific surveillance operations on a case-by-case basis. “He was at the heart of intelligence hubs and flows,” said Prof. Wark, who teaches at the University of Toronto. Prof. Leuprecht said he would specifically have had access to tactical intelligence — the position, activity and patterns of military and civilian vessels, for example — as well as strategic intelligence, including how Canada coordinates with the U.S. or how the military detects and reacts to threats.
Q. What kind of screening would SLt. Delisle have undergone to receive Top Secret clearance?
A. The first step toward Top Secret clearance is a reliability screening, which for sailors is done through the Canadian Forces Recruiting Group. This means confirmation of a person’s identity, as well as an assessment of that person’s “stability, trustworthiness, discretion, family pressures and habits,” according to a 2006 DND security audit. The next step is security clearance, which for a Canadian Forces officer falls under what is called the Deputy Provost Marshall Security office. Because SLt. Delisle would have had access to top secret material including signals intelligence, he would have been interviewed by CSIS, which would have also likely interviewed friends, and neighbours, employers to ensure his loyalty to Canada.
Q. If he was, indeed, passing information to the Russians, what might they have been after?
A. “There’s a whole range of possibilities,” Prof. Wark said. “There are things at the nightmare end of the spectrum — very sensitive information such as how coded communications work among allied navys. These are systems that are very complex to erect, and you rely on them to preserve the security of your military communications. This is the kind of signals intelligence that armed forces just dread losing.” John Thompson, a security expert and president of the Mackenzie Institute who once served in the military, said Russia has long been interested in Canada’s underwater surveillance technology, too. During the Cold War, he said Russia “would have given its eyeteeth” to know how Canada and its allies monitor their waters, and that the country would likely still like to know “if there are any dead-zones where they won’t be detected.”
Q. How active is Russia in its foreign espionage these days anyhow?
A. The FBI arrested 11 people in 2010 on suspicion they were part of a Russian espionage ring, living under deep cover and false names so they could penetrate American society and build relationships with academics, policy-makers, and entrepreneurs regarding finance and defence. Here in Canada in 2006, CSIS had “reasonable grounds to believe” that a foreign national living under the name Paul William Hampel was a member of the Sluzhba Vneshney Razvedki [SVR] — Russia’s main foreign intelligence agency and a successor to the now-defunct KGB. Court documents refer to a November, 2002, edition of Jane’s Intelligence Digest, which reported that the “Russian Federation was engaged in a massive stepping-up of espionage activities in Europe and North America” and that the agency was especially ramping up efforts in cities with “sizeable Russian emigre communities, such as Toronto.” The statement of information said so-called illegals use “legends created from false identities” based on identities of deceased people and communicate by “covert means to their control officers in Moscow.”
Q. How might this impact Canada’s relationship with its allies?
A. National Defence Minister Peter MacKay said this case will not damage Canada’s reputation abroad, telling reporters in Ottawa on Tuesday: “Let me assure you, our allies have full confidence in Canada.” Prof. Wark said our allies will be “careful about throwing stones,” given any one of them could become vulnerable to espionage at any given time. That said, he explained there could be “a lot of pain” associated with this alleged breach. “It depends on what, exactly, was lost through SLt. Delisle’s [alleged] betrayal,” he said. “But I don’t think it’ll have lasting consequences unless he betrayed the Holy of Holies of naval intelligence.”
“I tremble for my country when I reflect that God is just; that his justice cannot sleep forever.” Thomas Jefferson