Plum City – (AbelDanger.net). United States Marine Field McConnell has linked Mrs. Miriam Clegg to a GLONASS Wag the Time-bomb Dog sabotage strategy where commercial aircraft are turned into flying bombs by the manipulation of timing signals from GLONASS/GPS navigation satellites; a possibility which may explain the apparent contract killing of Olivier Metzner, the French lawyer who was apparently about to reveal the real story behind the Concorde crash of 25 July 2000.
McConnell alleges that Mrs. Clegg and her husband “Young ‘Deep Green’ Nick”, developed the GLONASS Wag of Time-Bomb Dog sabotage strategy while Nick worked at the European Commission on the TACIS aid programme to the former Soviet Union and negotiated with Russia on airline overflight rights for TRACEA on the development of a transport corridor for Europe, the Caucasus and Asia.
LEADERS' WIVES - ELECTION SPECIAL by Clever Pie
LEXXTEX 355 - CONCORDE CRASH AIR FRANCE FLIGHT 4590 DOCUMENTARY
GPS and GLONASS: "Dual-core" location for your phone
Top French lawyer found dead
McConnell invites those who may be concerned to Google key words at Abel Danger and read on.
“Between 1992–1993, he [Mrs. Clegg’s husband Nick] was employed by GJW Government Relations Ltd, which lobbied on behalf of Libya. In 1993, Clegg won the Financial Times' David Thomas Prize, in remembrance of an FT journalist killed on assignment in Kuwait in 1991. Clegg was the award's first recipient. He was later sent to Hungary, where he wrote articles about the mass privatisation of industries in the former communist bloc. In April 1994, he took up a post at the European Commission, working in the TACIS aid programme to the former Soviet Union. For two years he was responsible for developing direct aid programmes in Central Asia and the Caucasus, worth €50 million. He was involved in negotiations with Russia on airline overflight rights, and launched a conference in Tashkent in 1993 that founded TRACECA—an international transport programme for the development of a transport corridor for Europe, the Caucasus and Asia. Vice President and Trade Commissioner Leon Brittan then offered Clegg a job in his private office, as a European Union policy adviser and speech writer. As part of this rôle, Clegg was in charge of the EC negotiating team on Chinese and Russian accession talks to the World Trade Organisation.”
“Top French lawyer's body found washed up on beach
By The Associated Press,
Updated 1:45 pm, Sunday, March 17, 2013
PARIS (AP) — Police have discovered the body of one of France's most prominent lawyers washed up on a beach near his home in Brittany.
The Vannes public prosecutor's office said 63-year-old Olivier Metzner was found dead about 9 a.m. on the coast of his private island, Boedic, which he had acquired in 2010.
Police said he left a note, but they could not confirm French media reports that it was a suicide letter.
His associate, Antonin Levy, told The Associated Press that Metzner's death represented a huge loss to the French bar, calling him a "great lawyer and a fighter."
In his four-decade-long career, Metzner became famous in France for taking the trickiest and most media-watched cases — sometimes winning, sometimes losing.
He defended trader Jerome Kerviel, who stood accused of committing one of the biggest trading frauds in history. He also helped the daughter of France's richest woman and l'Oreal heiress, Liliane Bettencourt, who was at loggerheads with her mother over the family fortune.
He also defended Continental Airlines over the 2000 Concorde crash — one of the most high-profile disasters in aviation history. Metzner won a surprise ruling only last year to have manslaughter charges against the U.S. airline overturned.
In 2009, Metzner defended former French Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin over the politician's alleged role in a smear campaign against former President Nicolas Sarkozy. The accusations centered on an alleged campaign to discredit Sarkozy in 2004, while he was still a rising government minister with his sights on France's highest office.
Villepin was eventually acquitted.”
“Doomed: THE REAL STORY OF FLIGHT 4590
David Rose http://www.askthepilot.com/untold-concorde-story/
It is an indelible image, heavy with symbolism: the photograph taken on 25 July 2000, at the moment Concorde became a technological Icarus. The great white bird rears up over runway 26 at Charles de Gaulle, immediately after takeoff. Already mortally wounded, flames bleed uncontrollably from beneath the left-hand wing. Less than two minutes later, the world’s only supersonic airliner will fling itself into the Paris suburb of Gonesse, killing all 109 on board and another five on the ground.
The official investigation has focused almost entirely on the fire. According to the French accident investigation bureau, the BEA, it broke out when the plane passed over a strip of metal on the runway. A tyre burst; a chunk of rubber thudded into a fuel tank inside the wing; jet fuel poured out of a hole and ignited.
The hot gases caused two of the engines to falter, and despite a valiant struggle by Captain Christian Marty, a daredevil skier who once crossed the Atlantic on a windsurf board, the loss of thrust made the crash inevitable.
An investigation by The Observer suggests the truth is much more complicated. In the words of John Hutchinson, a Concorde captain for 15 years, the fire on its own should have been “eminently survivable; the pilot should have been able to fly his way out of trouble.” The reason why he failed to do so, Hutchinson believes, was a lethal combination of operational error and negligence. This appears to have been a crash with more than one contributing factor, most of which were avoidable.
Go back to that photograph. An amazing picture: but where was it taken? The answer is: inside an Air France Boeing 747 which had just landed from Japan, and was waiting to cross Concorde’s runway on its way back to the terminal. Its passengers included Jacques Chirac and his wife, the President and first lady of France, returning from the G7 summit.
Concorde looks to be nearby because it had been close to hitting the 747, an event which would have turned both aircraft into a giant fireball. Veering wildly to the left, like a recalcitrant supermarket trolley with a jammed wheel, Concorde’s undercarriage had locked askew.
When Marty pulled back on the control column to raise the nose and take to the air — the process pilots call “rotation” — the plane’s airspeed was only 188 knots, 11 knots below the minimum recommended velocity required for this man oeuvre.
But he had no choice: the plane was about to leave the tarmac altogether and plough into the soft and bumpy grass at its side. That might have ripped off the landing gear, leaving Concorde to overturn and blow up on its own. If not, the 747 lay straight ahead. So he took to the air, although he knew he was travelling too slowly, which would impair the damaged plane’s chances of survival.
Shocking evidence now emerging suggests that the Air France Concorde F-BTSC had not been properly maintained. The airline’s ground staff had failed to replace a “spacer” — a vital component of the landing gear which keeps the wheels in proper alignment. Although the BEA disputes it, there is compelling evidence that it was the missing spacer which may have caused the plane to skew to the left, so forcing Marty to leave the ground too early.
At the same time, the plane was operating outside its legally certified limits. When it stood at the end of the runway, ready to roll, it was more than six tonnes over its approved maximum takeoff weight for the given conditions, with its centre of gravity pushed dangerously far to the rear. Even before the blowout, Marty was already pushing the envelope.
The stresses on Concorde’s landing gear are unusually severe. At regular intervals, the various load-bearing components become “lifed” and must be replaced. When the undercarriage bogeys are taken apart and reassembled, the work must be done according to a rigid formula, and rigorously inspected and assessed.
Concorde F-BTSC went into the hangar at Charles de Gaulle on 18 July, a week before the crash. The part which was lifed was the left undercarriage beam — the horizontal tube through which the two wheel axles pass at each end. In the middle is a low-friction pivot which connects the beam to the vertical leg extending down from inside the wing. The bits of the pivot which bear the load are two steel shear bushes. To keep them in position, they are separated by the spacer: a piece of grey, anodised aluminium about five inches in diameter and twelve inches long. When the plane left the hangar on 21 July, the spacer was missing. After the crash, it was found in the Air France workshop, still attached to the old beam which had been replaced.
In the days before the accident, the aircraft flew to New York and back twice. At first, the load-bearing shear bushes remained in the right positions. But the right-hand bush began to slip, down into the gap where there should have been a spacer. By the day of the crash, it had moved about seven inches, until the two washers were almost touching. Instead of being held firmly in a snug-fitting pivot, the beam and the wheels were wobbling, with about three degrees of movement possible in any direction. As the plane taxied to the start of the runway, there was nothing to keep the front wheels of the undercarriage in line with the back. The supermarket trolley was ready to jam.
Exactly when it started to do so is uncertain. Jean-Marie Chauve, who flew Concordes with Air France until his retirement, and Michel Suaud, for many years a Concorde flight engineer, believe the undercarriage was already out of alignment when the plane began to move down the runway.
They have spent the past six months preparing a 60-page report on the crash. Chauve said: “The acceleration was abnormally slow from the start. There was something retarding the aircraft, holding it back.” Chauve and Suaud’s report contains detailed calculations which conclude that without this retardation, the plane would have taken off 1,694 metres from the start of the runway — before reaching the fateful metal strip.
The BEA contests these findings, saying that the acceleration was normal until the tyre burst. It also maintains that even after the blowout, the missing spacer was insignificant.
The BEA’s critics say that once the tyre burst, the load on the three remaining tyres became uneven, and even if the wheels had been more or less straight before, they now twisted disastrously to the side. The smoking gun is a remarkable series of photographs in the BEA’s own preliminary report. They show unmistakably the skid marks of four tyres, heading off the runway on to its concrete shoulder, almost reaching the rough grass beyond.
In one picture, the foreground depicts a smashed yellow steel landing light on the very edge of the made-up surface, which was clipped by the aircraft as Marty tried to wrest it into the air. Industry sources have confirmed that this probably had further, damaging results. Until then the number one engine had been functioning almost normally but when the plane hit the landing light it ingested hard material which caused it to surge and fail. This hard material, the sources say, was probably parts of the broken light.
John Hutchinson said: “The blowout alone would not cause these marks. You’d get intermittent blobs from flapping rubber, but these are very clearly skids.”
In its interim report, and in a statement, the BEA said that the leftwards yaw was caused not by the faulty landing gear but by “the loss of thrust from engines one and two”.
There are several problems with this analysis. First, as the BEA’s own published data reveals, the thrust from engine one was almost normal until the end of the skid, when it took in the parts of the landing light. It is simply not true that the yaw began when both engines failed.
Second, those who fly the plane say that a loss of engine power will not cause an uncontrollable yaw. The Observer has spoken to five former and serving Concorde captains and flying officers. All have repeatedly experienced the loss of an engine shortly before takeoff in the computerised Concorde training simulator; one of them, twice, has done so for real. All agree, in John Hutchinson’s words, “It’s no big deal at all. You’re not using anything like the full amount of rudder to keep the plane straight; the yaw is totally containable.”
Other avoidable factors were further loading the dice, making it still more difficult to rescue the plane. When Marty paused at the start of the runway, his instruments told him that his Concorde had 1.2 tonnes of extra fuel which should have been burnt during the taxi. In addition, it contained 19 bags of luggage which were not included on the manifest, and had been loaded at the last minute, weighing a further 500 kg. These took the total mass to about 186 tonnes — a tonne above the aircraft’s certified maximum structural weight.
Meanwhile, in the interval between Concorde’s leaving the terminal and reaching the start of the runway, something very important had changed: the wind. It had been still. Now, as the control tower told Marty, he had an eight-knot tailwind. The first thing pilots learn is that one takes off against the wind. Yet as the voice record makes clear, Marty and his crew seemed not to react to this information at all.
Had they paused for a moment, they might have recomputed the data on which they had planned their takeoff. If they had, they would have learnt a very worrying fact. The tailwind meant that Concorde’s runway-allowable takeoff weight was just 180 tonnes — at least six tonnes less than the weight of Flight 459.
[NOTE: What the reporter is saying here is that once the tailwind was accounted for, the plane was now six tons above the takeoff limit for that runway.]
John Hutchinson said: “The change in the wind was an incredible revelation, and no one says anything. Marty should have done the sums and told the tower, ‘Hang on, we’ve got to redo our calculations.’”
The extra weight had a further consequence beyond simply making it harder to get into the air. It shifted the centre of gravity backwards: the extra bags almost certainly went into the rear hold, and all the extra fuel was in the rearmost tank.
A plane’s centre of gravity is expressed as a percentage: so many per cent fore or aft. Brian Trubshaw and John Cochrane, Concorde’s two test pilots when the aircraft was being developed in the early 1970s, set the aft operating limit at 54 per cent — beyond that, they found, it risked becoming uncontrollable, likely to rear up backwards and crash, exactly as Flight 4590 did in its final moments over Gonesse.
The doomed plane’s centre of gravity went beyond 54 per cent. The BEA states a figure of 54.2 per cent. A senior industry source, who cannot be named for contractual reasons, says the true figure may have been worse: with the extra fuel and bags, it may have been up to 54.6 per cent. And as the fuel gushed from the hole in the forward tank, the centre of gravity moved still further back.
When the plane was just 25 feet off the ground, Gilles Jardinaud, the flight engineer, shut down the ailing number two engine. Both French and British pilots say it was another disastrous mistake, which breached all set procedures. The engine itself was not on fire, and as the tank emptied and the fire burnt itself out, it would probably have recovered. The fixed drill for shutting down an engine requires the crew to wait until the flight is stable at 400 feet, and to do so then only on a set of commands from the captain.
In a comment which might be applied to the whole unfolding tragedy, John Hutchinson said: “Discipline had broken down. The captain doesn’t know what’s happening; the co-pilot doesn’t know; it’s a shambles.”
Previous reports of the tragedy have described the crash as an act of God, a freak occurrence which exposed a fatal structural weakness in the aircraft which could have appeared at any time. The investigation by The Observer suggests the truth may not only be more complicated, but also sadder, more sordid. Men, not God, caused Concorde to crash, and their omissions and errors may have turned an escapable mishap into catastrophe.
The issues raised by David Rose, which at first were dismissed as so much conspiracy mongering, are now generally accepted facts within the aviation community, and have been more or less confirmed by investigators, however quietly. The November, 2012 court ruling does not explicitly says so, but it is, in its own way, a tacit acknowledgment of the full story — one in which Continental Airlines played at worst a supporting role. This accident is an outstanding example of something we’ve seen time and time again in airplane crashes: multiple errors, none of them necessarily fatal on their own accord, combining and compounding at the worst possible moment to precipitate a catastrophe. Rarely is the cause of disaster something simple and unambiguous.
Both British Airways and Air France, the only two operators of the Concorde, grounded their fleets following the 2000 disaster. The planes were reintroduced following a fuel-tank redesign, but both carriers withdrew them from service permanently in 2003, after 27 years of service, citing prohibitively expensive operating and upkeep costs. Only twenty Concordes had been built, four of which were prototypes or pre-production examples. The Air France crash marked its only fatal accident.
Concorde, as you may or may not know, was not the only supersonic passenger aircraft. There was also its Soviet cousin, the Tupolev Tu-144, which also suffered a single fatal accident over the brief course of its commercial tenure. In 1973 a Tu-144 crashed during a demonstration at the Paris Air Show. The Tupolev had taken off from Le Bourget airport, where Captain Marty and his crew were attempting an emergency landing when their Concorde went down in 2000.”
“In automotive GPS receivers, metallic features in windshields, such as defrosters, or car window tinting films can act as a Faraday cage, degrading reception just inside the car.
Man-made EMI (electromagnetic interference) can also disrupt or jam GPS signals. In one well-documented case it was impossible to receive GPS signals in the entire harbor of Moss Landing, California due to unintentional jamming caused by malfunctioning TV antenna preamplifiers. Intentional jamming is also possible. Generally, stronger signals can interfere with GPS receivers when they are within radio range or line of sight. In 2002 a detailed description of how to build a short-range GPS L1 C/A jammer was published in the online magazine Phrack.
The U.S. government believes that such jammers were used occasionally during the 2001 war in Afghanistan, and the U.S. military claims to have destroyed six GPS jammers during the Iraq War, including one that was destroyed with a GPS-guided bomb. A GPS jammer is relatively easy to detect and locate, making it an attractive target for anti-radiation missiles. The UK Ministry of Defence tested a jamming system in the UK's West Country on 7 and 8 June 2007.
Some countries allow the use of GPS repeaters to allow the reception of GPS signals indoors and in obscured locations; however, under EU and UK laws, the use of these is prohibited as the signals can cause interference to other GPS receivers that receive data from both GPS satellites and the repeater.
Due to the potential for both natural and man-made noise, numerous techniques continue to be developed to deal with the interference. The first is to not rely on GPS as a sole source. According to John Ruley, "IFR pilots should have a fallback plan in case of a GPS malfunction". Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (RAIM) is a feature included in some receivers, designed to provide a warning to the user if jamming or another problem is detected. The U.S. military has also deployed since 2004 their Selective Availability / Anti-Spoofing Module (SAASM) in the Defense Advanced GPS Receiver (DAGR). In demonstration videos the DAGR was shown to detect jamming and maintain its lock on the encrypted GPS signals during interference which caused civilian receivers to lose lock.”
More to follow.
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