Plum City – (AbelDanger.net). United States Marine Field McConnell has linked linked onion-router patent pool devices – apparently developed for peg-house madams trained by the MI-3 Innholders’ Livery Company – to wireless pressure-cooker bombs allegedly procured by Delta Hotels’ Vice President Marianne Duguay and placed to explode or intimidate near the Fairmont Hotel, Copley Square, Boston, and the Fairmont Empress Hotel, Victoria, B.C.
McConnell claims that MI-3 Innholders’ agents trained Duguay in peg-house entrapment at the Fairmont Princess in Bermuda (My name is Bond!) and showed her how to relay onion router detonation signals via hotel johns into the malicious exit nodes of bombs in Mumbai train 2006, Times Square car 2010, Boston Marathon 2013 and Parliament Building, Victoria, B.C. (FTE).
McConnell also claims that his MI-3 founder sister Kristine “Con Air” Marcy, had U.S. Navy onion routers embedded in the Canada’s Maritime Command Operational Information Network (MCOIN) and extorted the recently-convicted peg-house john Jeffrey Delisle into providing Duguay with the MCOIN root key needed to set up malicious exit nodes for the Boston / B.C. pressure cooker bombs.
MI-3B = Livery Company patent-pool supply-chain users of Privy Purse and Forfeiture Fund
Marcy (Forfeiture Fund – KPMG Small Business Loan Auction – Con Air Medical JABS)
+ Inkster (Privy Purse – KPMG tax shelter – RCMP Wandering Persons – Loss Adjuster fraud)
+ Interpol (Berlin ‘41-‘45 – Operation Paperclip Foreign Fugitive – William Higgitt – Entrust)
+ Intrepid (William Stephenson – GAPAN, Mariners patent pools – Wild Bill Pearl Harbor 9/11)
+Baginski (Serco Information Technologists Skynet sodomite mesh, KPMG Consulting Tillman)
MI-3 = Marine Interruption Intelligence and Investigation unit set up in 1987 to destroy above
McConnell’s Book 12 www.abeldanger.net shows agents in his Marine Interruption, Intelligence and Investigations (MI-3) group mingling in various OODA exit modes with agents of the Marcy Inkster Interpol Intrepid (MI-3) Livery protection racket based at Skinners’ Hall, Dowgate Hill.
#1771: Marine Links MI-3’s Starwood Peg-House Madams to Boston Pressure Cooker Bombs
“Marianne Duguay has been named Vice President, Asset Management at Delta Hotels and Resorts in Toronto, Canada This role will see Duguay continue to develop and execute the Asset Management plan for each of the bcIMC-owned assets, with the primary objective of driving superior asset and portfolio value of those owned properties currently within the Delta brand. Duguay rejoins Delta after a year with Fairmont Raffles Hotels International as Executive Director Hotel Analysis. Prior to her role with Delta as Director, Asset Management, Duguay was a leader at SITQ where she was responsible for the financial performance, investment management and value enhancement for a 17-property portfolio of Fairmont and Westin Hotels, located in Canada, the U.S. and the Caribbean [Princess Hotel Bermuda – My name is Bond]. Duguay is a graduate of McGill University and holds an MBA from the Université du Québec à Montréal.”
“British Government use in the Second World War  In 1939, when the world went to war, The Fairmont Hamilton Princess was under British Censorship and home to Allied servicemen. The basement became an intelligence center and way station where all mail, radio and telegraphic traffic bound for Europe, the U.S. and the Far East were intercepted and analyzed by 1,200 censors, of British Imperial Censorship, part of British Security Coordination (BSC), before being routed to their destination. With BSC working closely with the FBI, the censors were responsible for the discovery and arrest of a number of Axis spies operating in the US, including the Joe K ring. Rumor has it that it was nicknamed 'Bletchley-in-the-Tropics' after the English country house where the Enigma code was broken (Sir William Stephenson, the Canadian-born British spymaster who was the subject of the book and film A Man Called Intrepid resided for a time at the Princess, following the war, before buying a home on the island, and was often visited there by his former subordinate, James Bond novelist Ian Fleming).”
“thestar.com Canada Tuesday December 3, 2013
Jeffrey Delisle case: CSIS secretly watched spy, held file back from RCMP
A previously unknown operation raises questions about whether naval officer Jeffrey Delisle could have been arrested sooner.
By: Jim Bronskill Murray Brewster The Canadian Press, Published on Sun May 26 2013
OTTAWA—Canada’s spy agency clandestinely watched Jeffrey Delisle pass top secret information to Russia for months without briefing the RCMP — a previously unknown operation that raises questions about whether the naval officer could have been arrested sooner.
The Canadian Press has learned that the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation alerted the Canadian Security Intelligence Service to Delisle’s illicit dealings with Moscow well before the Mounties took on the file in December 2011 and later brought him into custody.
CSIS ultimately decided not to transfer its thick Delisle dossier to the RCMP. The spy agency, acting on legal advice, opted to keep its investigation sealed for fear of exposing a trove of Canadian and U.S. secrets of the intelligence trade in open court proceedings.
In a bizarre twist, it fell to the FBI — not CSIS — to send a letter to the RCMP spelling out how a Canadian was pilfering extremely sensitive information, including highly classified U.S. material.
The RCMP had to start its own investigation of Delisle almost from scratch. The delay alarmed and frustrated Washington as the geyser of secrets continued to spew.
More in thestar.com: Delisle gave no hints he was a traitor, spy chief says
Opinion: Jeffrey Delisle and the great intelligence spin cycle
Delisle eligible for conditional release in three years
At one point the Americans, eager to see Delisle in handcuffs, sketched out a Plan B: luring the Canadian officer to the U.S. and arresting him themselves, perhaps during a stopover en route to a Caribbean vacation.
Intelligence historian Wesley Wark said the RCMP and CSIS are supposed to be able to “seamlessly hand off cases back and forth between them.”
Wark, a visiting professor at the University of Ottawa’s graduate school of public and international affairs, said “it is deeply troubling” if the system indeed broke down in the Delisle case over CSIS’s refusal to share its files or to bring the RCMP in at an early stage.
“I think that’s scandalous, in fact,” said Wark, who served as an expert witness at Delisle’s sentencing. “And it would be a matter, I think, for a judicial inquiry or certainly a serious parliamentary investigation.”
According to Delisle’s lawyer, it also flags important legal concerns about the government’s obligation to disclose all the evidence against someone charged with breaching national security.
An investigation by The Canadian Press, drawing on numerous sources familiar with the Delisle case, reveals CSIS was deeply involved in the file before the Mounties entered the picture. Several sources spoke on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to discuss the case publicly.
The RCMP arrested Delisle, now 42, on Jan. 13, 2012, for violating the Security of Information Act. He pleaded guilty and last February was sentenced to 20 years in prison. Delisle had given secret material to Russia in exchange for upwards of $110,000 over a period of more than four years.
Until now, the official story — as revealed through the court record — has suggested the FBI first tipped Canadian authorities to Delisle’s relationship with the Russians on Dec. 2, 2011, via the letter to the RCMP. But the story actually begins months earlier.
Senior CSIS officials were called to Washington, where U.S. security personnel told them a navy officer in Halifax was receiving cash transfers from Russian agents. One of the paymasters was Mary Larkin, a known pseudonym used by Russian intelligence in running a U.S. spy ring busted by the FBI in 2010 that included the glamorous Anna [“Peg House”] Chapman and several others.
CSIS soon obtained court approval to begin electronic surveillance of Delisle.
Despondent over his failed marriage and nursing financial woes, Delisle decided in 2007 to commit “professional suicide,” as he would later put it, by walking into the Russian embassy in Ottawa and volunteering to offer up some of Western intelligence’s most valuable secrets.
He spied for the Russians while working in sensitive posts at National Defence headquarters, including the military’s nerve centre, the Strategic Joint Staff, and at the office of the Chief of Defence Intelligence.
As a sub-lieutenant at the Trinity intelligence centre in Halifax, Delisle had access to a data bank of classified secrets shared by the Five Eyes community — Canada, the United States, Britain, Australia and New Zealand.
It soon became clear to CSIS that Delisle was handing over a great deal of highly sensitive material originating from the United States.
“The information he gave up caused grave damage — grave damage — to the U.S.,” said one source. “We’re getting into the category of sources, techniques and methods of the most sensitive nature.”
Pressure on the Canadians began to build as American patience eroded. The FBI director and senior U.S. justice officials called counterparts in Canada [Limited hang out].
“There was a very small subset of information provided by Delisle that impacted a couple of other of the Five Eyes, but it paled in comparison to the volume and gravity of the U.S. information he gave up,” the source said.
In mid-September 2011, Delisle was summoned to Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, to meet one of his Russian handlers.
But it wasn’t Delisle’s obvious lack of a vacation tan that prompted Canada Border Services Agency officials to submit him to a secondary search upon his return. CSIS had tipped the border agency to Delisle’s pending arrival at the Halifax airport in a bid to gather more evidence for the case against him.
During its search, the border agency discovered a Rio hotel receipt [MI-3 Innholders set up], more than $6,500 in cash — most of it new $100 American bills — and prepaid credit cards.
After reviewing the case, CSIS lawyers said handing the spy service’s file to the RCMP would pose the risk that both U.S. and Canadian secrets — investigative sources and methods — might be disclosed in criminal court as part of the requirement to ensure a fair trial.
During a meeting in Ottawa, CSIS, the FBI and RCMP discussed the possibility of arresting Delisle in the United States during an airport stopover, or by arranging a U.S. military secondment or training course for him. However, it was decided jointly that the FBI would send a letter to the RCMP about the case.
It almost “shocks the conscience” that a U.S. agency had to formally notify the Mounties, said a source who spoke out of concern about what they see as systemic flaws in Canada’s intelligence apparatus that allowed Delisle to pass on secrets longer than necessary. “CSIS had already made the case. But RCMP had to do it again.”
As the Mounties investigated, the junior intelligence officer continued to pass information to the Russians that was “as damaging or more damaging” than earlier packages uncovered during the CSIS probe, one source said.
Another source with knowledge of the investigation said ideally the Canadian Forces would have detected Delisle’s actions and told CSIS.
“CSIS should have helped (the Forces) to investigate a little bit more,” said the source. “Eventually when they collected enough evidence, we say, ‘We’ve got a criminal case here,’ then we go to the RCMP and we let the RCMP prepare the criminal case from the investigation.”
Delisle’s lawyer, Mike Taylor, said he knew nothing of the earlier investigation by CSIS and found the revelation “disturbing,” adding it raises serious questions about whether his client’s charter rights were violated, and how the Canadian government pursues national security investigations.
“I’ve always had concerns about what was going on behind the scenes,” Taylor said in an interview.
The existence of the spy service investigation and the resulting document trail should have been part of the court record, Taylor said, and had he known about them it would have affected the advice he gave to his client.
In the end, Delisle might still have pleaded guilty, Taylor said, but nevertheless he should have been given the “opportunity to chase back and determine whether information was obtained unlawfully.”
For example, the search conducted by border agents upon Delisle’s return from Brazil could have been deemed “tainted,” unreasonable and “subject to exclusion” in light of the CSIS investigation, he said.
“It certainly could have changed the timing (of Delisle’s response) because he might not have been so quick to go ahead and say, ‘OK, look, I’m done.’ ”
There is no possibility of an appeal and Taylor said he understands there’s little public sympathy for someone who has admitted to selling out his country, but he argues the government has a legal obligation to disclose everything it knows to an accused.
“They cannot be allowed to operate under that kind of a covert veil,” Taylor said. “The potential for civil rights violations is huge.”
CSIS was created in 1984 from the ashes of the old RCMP Security Service, which was disbanded following a series of headline-grabbing scandals. The new spy service would gather information and advise the federal government of security threats, but have no arrest powers.
It has meant that CSIS must hand over a case to the RCMP or work in parallel with the Mounties, then pass along the file when it comes time to take suspected spies or terrorists into custody.
But it hasn’t always gone smoothly.
The infamous case of the 1985 Air India airliner bombing is often cited as the most obvious failure to forge a well-oiled working relationship between the agencies.
Both CSIS and the RCMP had no comment on the spy service’s involvement in the Delisle file. The FBI did not respond to a request to discuss the case, and it would not release any information in response to a Freedom of Information Act application, citing Delisle’s privacy rights.
The Canadian Press asked Fadden after the February committee hearing about the timing of CSIS’s awareness of the Delisle case, but he declined to answer. Fadden recently became deputy minister of defense.
Michel Coulombe, CSIS’s deputy director of operations, refused to speak with the news agency. He has since become the spy agency’s interim director.”
“Tor: Yes Or No?
February 2nd, 2011 Submitted by Paul Rosenberg
I think that most Internet users with an interest in privacy have heard of Tor, the system of what is called onion routing.
Onion routing is a technique for repeatedly encrypting and forwarding data through several network nodes called onion routers. Each router removes a layer of encryption to uncover routing instructions, then sends the message to the next router where this is repeated. Intermediary nodes are prevented from knowing the origin, destination, and contents of the message. (Exit nodes know both the destination and the contents.)
So, Tor is a very clever technology, and it is free, so why isn’t it used more? And why then, should anyone pay for an anonymity service?
There reason is that Tor has some rather severe limitations:
Tor is slow. Routing through an unpredictable path takes time, and varying lengths of time.
Tor is free. Yes, this is a serious problem. When someone owns something and generates income from it, they almost always take care of it, and usually work hard to improve it. No such efforts are routinely applied to free things. Fixing a problem at a Tor node may or may not happen; upgrading is done strictly when convenient.
Tor may include malicious nodes. When anyone can run a node, it’s not always nice people who do so. Think of it from a crook’s standpoint: Here we have lots of data traffic that people are trying to protect; it must be of some value. Anyone can open a node and gather information, with no path back to us – we’re just random people on the Internet, posing as humanitarians. Why not do it? When everyone (even groups like the CIA) can run a tor node anonymously and without any accountability, they can act badly and get away with it. And, in fact, several leaks of data through malicious Tor exit nodes have been confirmed.
Tor is only for web browsing. For example, at my last check, no one was allowing email to run over their Tor node; it is simply too problematic. There are a lot more things to protect than surfing.
Tor requires all the software on your computer that accesses the internet to be cooperative. Many programs, however, (whether created by shady marketers, governments, crooks, or just poorly written) are not cooperative, but bypass Tor and give away your network identity.
For most people, Tor is too hard to use regularly. This makes security errors and leaks much more likely.”
“MARITIME COMMAND OPERATIONAL INFORMATION NETWORK
The Maritime Command Operational Information Network III (MCOIN III) is a Canadian Department of National Defence (DND) shore-based operational information system used by Navy personnel for Command and Control message handling and distribution, including the reception, processing, distribution, and transmission of military messages, and the acquisition and processing of contact data from multiple sources. It also provides dynamic information on the location and status of Canadian Navy vessels and other vessels of interest to DND. MCOIN III was developed using MDA's proven capabilities in the development of near-real time systems to acquire, transmit, process, store and display large volumes of geographically-related information within a secure environment.
The system is in operation at the Navy's MARLANT Headquarters in Halifax, Nova Scotia and at MARPAC in Esquimalt, British Columbia, with a subset of the system deployed at Chief Maritime Services, National Defence Headquarters in Ottawa. The system connects directly to the Department of National Defence strategic communications Automated Defence Data Network (ADDN) system, with interfaces to other government departments and allies.
The system refines and fuses received information into a Recognized Maritime Picture for Canada, accessible by Naval Formation Commanders on both coasts. MCOIN III collects, processes, and disseminates information to other military and non-military agencies and organizations on a 24/7 basis, enhancing naval operations in Canada and facilitating cooperation with other Command and Control systems, including those used by the US Navy, Canadian Coast Guard, RCMP, and the Department of Fisheries and Oceans.”
“OPERATIONAL GROUND SYSTEMS
MDA is a leading supplier of high-throughput, operational intelligence satellite ground systems for the defence and intelligence community, with systems currently installed at over 70 locations around the world.
The company's multi-sensor solutions enable customers to plan, task, receive, process, exploit, and disseminate optical, SAR, and hyperspectral data from more than 20 commercially available satellite missions. MDA's modular ground system approach enables customers to rapidly tailor a complete and accurate solution for their requirements, with the ability to easily integrate with existing information sources and new sensors in the future.
MDA is the operational ground system supplier of choice for defence and intelligence organizations around the world because the company's integrated multi-sensor solution means that customers can collect more data per visit and receive twice the capability of competitive offerings, at a lower cost. MDA is the headquarters system supplier for DigitalGlobe ,and authorized general ground station supplier for DigitalGlobe and GeoEye, the two highest-resolution commercial optical satellite missions in operation. MDA is also the exclusive provider of RapidEye regional ground stations. The company's RADARSAT-2 satellite expands the level of exclusivity to ensure access to the most powerful commercial information sources in orbit.
Regardless of size or need, MDA has an operational ground system solution to fit requirements and budget. With options ranging from agile mobile configurations to large scale fixed implementations, MDA solutions address any level of surveillance. Backed by an international Earth observation heritage spanning 40 years and a disciplined approach to fixed-price system delivery, the company has an unsurpassed record of on-schedule, on-budget system delivery.”
“From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
A pressure cooker bomb is an improvised explosive device (IED) created by inserting explosive material into a pressure cooker and attaching a blasting cap into the cover of the cooker.
Pressure cooker bombs have been used in a number of attacks in the 21st century. Among them have been the 2006 Mumbai train bombings, 2010 Stockholm bombings (failed to explode), the 2010 Times Square car bombing attempt (failed to explode), and the 2013 Boston Marathon bombings.
On Canada Day 2013, Pressure cooker bombs failed to explode at the Parliament Building in Victoria, British Columbia.”
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