Plum City – (AbelDanger.net). United States Marine Field McConnell has linked linked the hedgie hotel murder (‘HHM’) for hire operations of Lord Thurso’s MI-3 Innholders Livery Company, to the 1991 Bilderberger Bill Clinton and the FBI Director and former General Counsel for Bridgewater Associates James Comey, who allegedly arranged decoy indictments to camouflage the Toronto Bilderberg meeting (May 30 - June 2 1996) at which the Khobar Towers was apparently selected as a bombing target for Serco war-room commanders in nearby hedgie hotels.
Hedgie Hotel = Slang for hedge-fund investments in hotel honeypots/honeynets
Indictments in Khobar Towers Bombing Jun 21, 2001
Immigration Attorney Michael Wildes on Fox comments on "Attack on Khobar Towers"
McConnell also claims that Hillary Clinton brokered Serco’s development of MI-3 tag and war-room patent pools and sent her husband to the 1991 Bilderberg conference to learn how and why hotel hedge-fund investors deploy news, snuff, triage and firefighter teams to liquidate over-leveraged assets at nearby crime scenes.
Noting that hedgie hotel script kiddies often die after relaying signals via Serco tags, McConnell may title his next book: “Serco’s Innholders – Lord Thurso’s List,” as it appears the 1963 movie “The List of Adrian Messenger” may be a template for ongoing murders.
McConnell notes that Serco (formerly RCA GB 1928) and the MI-3 Innholders used Bermuda’s Fairmont Hamilton Princess as a honeypot hotel during WWII and while the Internet term script kiddie is new, the profiles of triaged victims and black-hat and white-hat hackers are unchanged:
Royal Hawaiian Hotel and the triage of Pearl Harbor
Lawrence Hotel and the triage of JFK
Hôtel des Mille Collines and the triage of Tutsis during the Rwanda Genocide
Hôtel Ritz Paris and the triage of Princess Di
Marriott World Trade Center and the triage of guests of The 9/11 Hotel Sheraton Pentagon City Hotel and the 9/11 triage on the Pentagon Lawn
Edgeware Road Hilton Hotel and the 7/7 triage of Mohammad Sidique Khan
Abbott Gardens Hotel, Pakistan and the triage of Osama bin Laden
Hotel Inter-Continental Kabul and the triage of Seal Team 6
Charlesmark Hotel and the triage at the Boston Marathon
Tibesti Hotel and the 9/11/2012 triage of Ambassador Stevens in Benghazi Residence Inn (Marriott) and the triage of Aaron Alexis in the Navy Yard
Holiday Inn Glasgow and the triage of police helicopter crash on Clutha pub
Regent Grand Hotel Bordeaux and the triage of Kok Lam’s Brilliant helicopter
Twin Cities Aloft and Jazeera Palace Hotel and the triage in the Michelangelo Towers!
MI-3B = Livery Company patent-pool supply-chain users of Privy Purse and Forfeiture Fund
Marcy (Forfeiture Fund – KPMG Small Business Loan Auction – Con Air Medical JABS)
+ Inkster (Privy Purse – KPMG tax shelter – RCMP Wandering Persons – Loss Adjuster fraud)
+ Interpol (Berlin ‘41-‘45 – Operation Paperclip Foreign Fugitive – William Higgitt – Entrust)
+ Intrepid (William Stephenson – GAPAN, Mariners patent pools – Wild Bill Pearl Harbor 9/11)
+Baginski (Serco Information Technologists Skynet sodomite mesh, KPMG Consulting Tillman)
MI-3 = Marine Interruption Intelligence and Investigation unit set up in 1987 to destroy above
McConnell’s Book 12 www.abeldanger.net shows agents in his Marine Interruption, Intelligence and Investigations (MI-3) group mingling in various OODA exit modes with agents of the Marcy Inkster Interpol Intrepid (MI-3) Livery protection racket based at Skinners’ Hall, Dowgate Hill.
Prequel 1: #1811: Marine Links MI-3 Honeypot Hotel Matrix to Boothby Pedophile, Kerry Bilderberg, and Marcy’s Duane St. HUBZone Bomb
Prequel 2: #1589: Marine Links James Comey – Obama’s FBI Pick – to Theft of Lockheed F35 Secrets
The inside story of how the most surreal night of the War on Terror united the retiring FBI director and his evident successor.By Garrett M. Graff
Published May 30, 2013
The sun had already been up for over an hour by the time James Comey and Bob Mueller approached the West Wing of the White House shortly after 7 AM on March 12, 2004. Neither had slept much in the previous week. The weather was windy and cool; the thermometer hovered just over 40 degrees as they prepared to brief the president. The two-minute ride up from the Hoover Building to the White House complex that morning hadn’t left them much time to gather their thoughts, but there was still a level of calm about them as they alighted from the black Suburban on West Executive Drive, just steps from the Oval Office.
The enormous Old Executive Office Building, once home to the nation’s entire State and War Departments, loomed over the back of the SUV. A stream of White House staff passed back and forth between the two buildings, their coveted ID badges slipped into shirt pockets or dangling from their necks. At that hour, many were on the way to or from the White House mess, the navy’s small cafeteria in the basement of the executive mansion. Comey, introspective by instinct, paused for a moment, considering what lay ahead; Mueller, never much for reflection, did not.
As they crossed the threshold into the White House, both men fully expected it to be the last time they would enter the building, the last time they would brief the president, the last time their motorcade would pass through the White House gate without a pause, zipping past the Jersey barriers and gawking tourists straining to see through the tinted windows. Sitting in their desks at the Justice Department and the Bureau were letters of resignation, which they expected to submit over the weekend; a dozen other Justice and Bureau officials would join them. They would have submitted the letters already, except that the attorney general’s chief of staff had asked them to wait until the hospitalized John Ashcroft had recuperated enough to resign as well.
By Monday, Mueller and Comey believed, their security details would be gone; they’d be left alone to face what would inevitably be a media conflagration reminiscent of the infamous Saturday Night Massacre in October 1973, when Richard Nixon had forced the dismissal of independent prosecutor Archibald Cox, which led to the resignations of Attorney General Elliot Richardson and Deputy Attorney General William Ruckelshaus, the former acting FBI director. This storm would be different: The entire leadership of the Justice Department and the FBI would go in one fell swoop over a controversy that no one would talk about and no one outside of a small group in government even knew that was brewing.
That dramatic week had united the two men—both career public servants—deepening a friendship forged in the crucible of the highest levels of the national security apparatus after the 9/11 attacks.
Although they’d been aware of each other for years, sharing their similar orbits, Comey and Mueller were first brought together professionally by then-FBI director Louis Freeh in the opening days of the Bush administration.
After a tumultuous and contentious tenure as Clinton’s FBI director—and sometimes chief critic of the scandal-plagued president—Freeh was eager to leave his post. The private sector was calling as his six sons neared college age. Yet frustrated by the Clinton administration’s unwillingness to prosecute the bombers of Khobar Towers, who had killed 19 US Air Force personnel in 1996, Freeh didn’t want to step down as FBI director until he’d seen that case through.
From the earliest days, Freeh believed that the Clinton administration didn’t want to solve the Khobar bombing—it did not want to admit the guilty party was Iran because it didn’t want to have to retaliate against the Iranian regime, just as it had earlier measured attacking Osama bin Laden in the wake of the ’98 Embassy bombings against its need for allies in the Pakistani government.
Freeh believed Wilma Lewis, the U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia, who had jurisdiction on Khobar Towers, was dragging her feet and he decided to wait out his opponents. He spent the final year of the Clinton administration courting Comey, then a federal prosecutor in the Eastern District of Virginia, to take over the investigation. As the Bush administration took office in 2001, Freeh asked Bob Mueller, who was acting as John Ashcroft’s deputy attorney general, to transfer the case to Comey.
When he finally did so, Mueller called Comey with a warning: “Wilma Lewis is going to be so pissed.” Indeed, Lewis blasted the decision, as well as both Freeh and Mueller personally, in a press release, saying the move was “ill-conceived and ill-considered.” But Freeh’s gambit paid off.
Within weeks, Comey had pulled together the indictment. During a National Security Council briefing at the White House, under the watchful gaze of Secretary of State Colin Powell, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, Comey presented overwhelming evidence of Iran’s involvement.
On the eve of the expiration of the statute of limitations, fourteen individuals were indicted for the attack. Freeh, who stepped down the next day, said the indictment was “a major step toward making sure that those responsible are brought to justice, as well as a testament to the value and necessity of international law enforcement cooperation to counter the danger in today’s world.”
Mueller, now 68, and Comey, now 52, would become close partners and close allies throughout the years ahead.
Mueller became FBI director following Freeh, starting just a week before the September 11th. Comey took over as the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York, the most important U.S. Attorney’s Office in the country, later that fall. The New York job put him squarely in the center of the unfolding war on terror and would, over the next five years, put him on a path to being one of the most significant players in the U.S. government.”
“FOCUS ON: INTEL JUNE 25, 1996: THE KHOBAR TOWERS ATTACK AND THE FBI INVESTIGATION THAT FOLLOWED By: LOUIS J. FREEH Date: JUNE 25 , 2012
Shortly before 10:00 p.m. local time on June 25, 1996, a Datsun driven by Hani al-Sayegh, a prominent member of the Saudi branch of Hezbollah, or “Party of God,” pulled into the far corner of a parking lot adjacent to Building 131 at the King Abdul Aziz Airbase in Dhahran, along the oil-rich Persian Gulf coast of Saudi Arabia. The eight-story apartment structure was part of a housing complex known collectively as Khobar Towers, then home to more than two thousand American, British, French, and Saudi troops. Building 131 was occupied almost exclusively by members of the U.S. Air Force, enforcing the no-fly zone that had been in effect over southern Iraq ever since the end of the first Gulf War. With al-Sayegh in the Datsun was Abdallah al-Jarash, who had been recruited into Hezbollah at the Sayyeda Zeinab shrine in Damascus.
A few minutes later, a white, four-door Chevrolet Caprice entered the parking lot and waited for the Datsun to blink its lights—the all-clear signal. When it did, a tanker truck followed the Chevy into the lot. The truck had been purchased earlier that month from a Saudi dealership for approximately 75,000 Saudi riyals and taken to a farm outside Qatif, twenty minutes or so from Dhahran. There it had been outfitted with some five thousand pounds of explosives and turned into a massive bomb.
After the truck backed up to a fence just in front of the north side of Building 131, the driver, Ahmed al-Mughassil, commander of the military wing of the Saudi Hezbollah, and his passenger, Ali al-Houri, a main Hezbollah recruiter, leaped from the cab, raced to the Chevy, and drove off, followed by the Datsun.
Sgt. Alfredo Guerrero was pulling sentry duty on the rooftop at Building 131 when he saw the driver and passenger abandon the truck and the two cars speed away. Almost certain that they were staring at a bomb in the lot below them, Guerrero and two other sentries sounded an alarm. Then Guerrero, who had been stationed in Dhahran for only a month, began to race through the top floors of Building 131, warning people to leave. The sergeant had cleared the better part of two floors when the tank truck exploded, ripping a crater thirty-five feet deep and eighty-five feet wide and shearing off the north face of the apartment building.
Despite the heroism of Alfredo Guerrero, who escaped without serious injury, nineteen Americans were murdered at Khobar Towers and more than five dozen others were hospitalized. In all, 372 U.S. military personnel suffered wounds in the explosion. Khobar was the most deadly attack on American citizens abroad in thirteen years, since the October,1983 explosion at a U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon, killed 241 marines. And the totals might have been far higher. In his haste, the driver of the truck had parked perpendicular to Building 131. Had he parked parallel and delivered the impact of the explosion along a broader front, he might have succeeded in toppling the entire structure, with a catastrophically greater loss of life.
But within the confines of a secretive and deeply conflicted culture, the Saudis, I thought, had probably gone as far as they could toward accommodating us. Pushing them further into our camp, getting them to see the investigation more through our eyes, would take pressure from the very top of our own government. And that, as the investigation wore on and more and more new information bubbled to the surface, was precisely where I found myself most stymied: not halfway around the world on the Arabian Peninsula but at home, a half dozen blocks up Pennsylvania Avenue.
Let me try to explain.
I was probably still suffering from jet lag from that initial trip to Saudi Arabia when I had my first serious conversations with Sandy Berger on how to handle the bombing. All things being equal, I told the then-deputy national security adviser, we would expect to undertake the criminal investigation. That was our statutory duty. We had the resources and talent to undertake the job, and the will to see it through. Just as important, we had the Saudis about as lined up as we were likely to get them on the front end. But all things weren’t equal. That was obvious. Even though the attack had occurred on foreign soil, this had been an act of war against the United States of America. Saudis were killed, to be sure, but American military personnel had been targeted. If the president decided to take military or other action against the perpetrators, I didn’t want the criminal investigation to get in the way, and I certainly didn’t want the president deferring to the Department of
Justice or the FBI just because he would be preempting our investigation.
In retrospect, the point I was trying to make sounds almost petty. An American military barracks was in ruins; people had been left blown apart in the blistering Saudi sun. I’d seen them there, and I would never forget the sight. To me, though, the matter I was raising was crucial, and in the months that followed, I repeated it constantly. The FBI was going after the killers with everything at our disposal. I couldn’t guarantee we would ever bring them to trial, but we would continue to pursue them until we had run every last one of them to ground. But we understood that in the hierarchy of possible responses, ours was second tier. Bill Clinton was commander in chief. If he decided that we were getting in the way of more appropriate action, we would step aside.
Bill Clinton had courted me to become FBI director three years earlier, but by the early summer of 1996, fault lines were showing in our relationship. Maybe I was, in Clinton’s eyes, too much the altarboy I once had been, or too insensitive to the nuances of politics. Whatever had driven a wedge between us, the strain was an open secret within the inner circle of the administration. That, too, was on my mind as I sought to clarify the Bureau’s position relative to the Khobar Towers investigation: I’d fallen off the A-list at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue. But Sandy Berger knew all that, and he was very definitive in his response every time I raised the matter: The president is clear on this, he would tell me. He wants you to conduct the investigation, and he has told the Saudis that. The FBI is in charge; Louis Freeh is the point man. The Bureau, I was assured, had the president’s complete cooperation and authority on this. I remember the phrase exactly because the administration was still repeating it three years later: we were to leave “no stone unturned” in finding the killers and bringing them to justice. Trouble was, the administration’s actions didn’t come close to matching its rhetoric.
I traveled twice again to Saudi Arabia during the months just after that first visit. On one of those trips, Prince Bandar took me aside and told me, “Listen, we have the goods,” and slowly, very slowly, with many fits and starts, the “goods” did begin to come together. As they did, they pointed ineluctably toward Iran.
(On that same trip, during a dinner at Bandar’s Riyadh palace, the elegant Saudi ambassador to the U.S. reached his well-manicured hand into a roast baby camel’s hump, drew out a fistful of meat, and deposited it on my plate–a great honor, he assured me. It was my one and only experience with baby camel’s hump, but it was good: closer to tenderloin than chicken in flavor.)
In March 1997, in the first truly big break in the case, Canadian authorities acting on a tip from the Saudis arrested the driver of the Datsun used in the Khobar Towers bombing, Hani al-Sayegh. Al-Sayegh, who had been living in Canada since August 1996 under afalse passport, denied any part in the attack, but that May, under questioning in an Ottawa detention center by an assistant U.S. attorney and several FBI agents, he did admit to having once been a member of the Hezbollah cell that carried it out. He had been recruited for the cell, he said, by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard and had taken part in two operations directed by one of the Guard’s brigadier generals, Ahmad Sherifi.”
“US Officials Leaked False Story Blaming Iran for Khobar Attack
In March 1997, FBI Director Louis Freeh got what he calls in his memoirs "the first truly big break in the case": the arrest in Canada of one of the Saudi Hezbollah members the Saudis accused of being the driver of the getaway car at Khobar Towers.
In order to be transferred to the United States without facing deportation to Saudi Arabia, where he was believed to face the death penalty, al-Sayegh had to agreed to a plea bargain under which he would admit to having proposed an attack on U.S. personnel, for which he would have to serve up to 10 years in prison.
In fact, the only thing al-Sayegh had actually admitted to, according to FBI sources, was having proposed an attack on one AWACS plane that had been turned over to the Saudi Air Force – a proposal he said had been rejected. Both before and after being brought to Washington, moreover, Al-Sayegh steadfastly denied any knowledge of the Khobar Towers bombing.
Despite that consistent denial by al-Sayegh, a Washington Post story on Apr. 14, 1997 quoted U.S. and Saudi officials as saying that al-Sayegh had met two years earlier with senior Iranian intelligence officer Brig. Gen. Ahmad Sherifi and that Iran was the "organizing force" behind the Khobar bombing. That story, leaked by officials supporting the Saudi version of the Khobar story, cited Canadian intercepts of al-Sayegh’s phone conversations in Ottawa before his arrest as allegedly incriminating evidence.
xxxxxxThe story lent further credence to the general belief in Washington that Iran had masterminded the bombing, mainly because U.S. intelligence had observed the surveillance of U.S. military and civilian sites in Saudi Arabia by Iranians and their Saudi allies in 1994 and 1995.
Al-Sayegh admitted having carried out the surveillance of one military site other than Khobar for the Iranians, but insisted that it was not to prepare for a possible terrorist bombing but to identify potential targets for Iranian retaliation in the event of a U.S. attack on Iran.
While most official analysts were ready to believe that Iran was plotting a terrorist attack against the United States, Neumann recalls that he had discerned a pattern in Iranian behavior: every time U.S.-Iran tensions rose, there was an increase in Iranian reconnaissance of U.S. diplomatic and military faculties.
"The pattern could be taken as hostile but it could equally have been defensive," says Neumann, meaning that the Iranians viewed such reconnaissance of possible U.S. targets as part of their deterrent to a U.S. attack.
Hani al-Sayegh would have been a strange choice for driver of the getaway car at Khobar Towers. A frail man whose frequent asthma attacks repeatedly interrupted his interviews with the FBI, al-Sayegh recounted to investigators he had entered military training with the Iranian IRGC, but had been told by his IRGC handler after one particularly disastrous exercise that his asthma made him unfit for military operations.
Hani al-Sayegh continued to deny either that he was involved or the Iranians had anything to do with Khobar, and as a result was deported to Saudi Arabia in 1999 – despite the widespread assumption within the FBI that he would be beheaded on his return.
Freeh had no case against the Iranians and their Saudi allies unless he could get access to the Saudi Shi’a detainees. In the memoir "My FBI", Freeh charged that President Bill Clinton refused to press Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah for access to those prisoners and then asked him for a contribution to the future Clinton presidential library at a meeting at the Hay-Adams Hotel in September 1998.
But what Freeh left out of the story is that Abdullah’s new offer came at a time when the Saudis felt a greater need to appease Washington on the Khobar Towers investigation than they had previously.
In May 1998, the CIA had learned that Saudi intelligence had broken up an al Qaeda plot to smuggle Sagger anti-tank missiles from Yemen into Saudi Arabia about a week before a scheduled visit to Saudi by Vice-President Al Gore and had not informed U.S. intelligence about the incident.
Then, on Aug. 7, 1998, the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania had been bombed 10 minutes apart. The CIA had quickly ascertained that al Qaeda was responsible for the bombings, with the result that U.S. intelligence began to focus more on bin Laden’s operations in Saudi Arabia.
Gore had met with Abdullah on Sep. 24, and had pressed hard for access to an important al Qaeda finance official, Madani al Tayyib, who had been detained by the Saudi government the previous year, but kept away from U.S. intelligence.
The Saudi regime had long acted to keep the United States away from the bin Laden trail in Saudi. During the Afghan War, high-ranking Saudi officials, including interior minister Prince Nayef himself, had worked closely with bin Laden. And those ties had apparently continued even after the Saudi government revoked bin Laden’s citizenship, froze his assets, and began cracking down on some anti-government Islamic extremists in 1994.
Evidence soon appeared that the regime had allowed Saudi supporters of bin Laden to finance his operations through Saudi charities, while encouraging bin Laden to focus on the U.S. military rather than the regime.
9/11 Commission investigators later learned that, after bin Laden’s move from Sudan to Afghanistan in May 1996, a delegation of Saudi officials had asked top Taliban leaders to tell bin Laden that if he didn’t attack the regime, "recognition will follow".
Meanwhile, Nayef was resisting CIA requests for bin Laden’s birth certificate, passport and bank records.
The CIA had been sharing its own intelligence on bin Laden with the Mabahith, the Saudi secret police, including copies of National Security Agency interceptions of the cell phone conversations of suspected al Qaeda officials. Then the militants suddenly stopped using their cell phones, indicating they had been tipped off by the Mabahith.
In early 1997, the CIA’s bin Laden station even issued a memorandum for CIA Director George Tenet, who was about to travel to Saudi Arabia, identifying Saudi intelligence as a "hostile service".
By late September 1998, the Saudi regime was feeling the heat from the Clinton administration for its failure to cooperate on bin Laden’s operations in Saudi Arabia. Abdullah’s proposal was a way to demonstrate cooperation on terrorism while helping Freeh promote the Saudi line on Khobar Towers.
Read more at http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=f45_1245951802#ZS5AKufQYVtFJKS6.99”
“Marriott International, Inc. (NYSE:MAR): On 3/31/11 Bridgewater Associates reported holding 322,073 shares with a market value of $11,459,358. This comprised 0.19% of the total portfolio. On 6/30/11, Bridgewater Associates held 607,773 shares with a market value of $21,569,865. This comprised 0.30% of the total portfolio. The net change in shares for this position over the two quarters is 285,700. About the company: Marriott International Inc. is a worldwide operator and franchisor of hotels. The Company franchises lodging facilities and vacation timesharing resorts under various brand names. Marriott also provides services to home and condominium owner associations for projects associated with several of its brands.
Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc. (NYSE:HOT): On 3/31/11 Bridgewater Associates reported holding 206,127 shares with a market value of $11,980,101. This comprised 0.20% of the total portfolio. On 6/30/11, Bridgewater Associates held 360,127 shares with a market value of $20,181,517. This comprised 0.29% of the total portfolio. The net change in shares for this position over the two quarters is 154,000. About the company: Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc. owns, manages, and franchises luxury and upscale hotels throughout the world. The Company also develops and operates vacation interval ownership resorts.”
“Serco’s Office of Partner Relations (OPR) helps facilitate our aggressive small business utilization and growth strategies. Through the OPR, Serco mentors four local small businesses under formal Mentor Protégé Agreements: Three sponsored by DHS (Base One Technologies, TSymmetry, Inc., and HeiTech Services, Inc.,) and the fourth sponsored by GSA (DKW Communications, Inc.). Serco and HeiTech Services were awarded the 2007 DHS Mentor Protégé Team Award for exceeding our mentoring goals.”
“Base One Technologies – Corporate Strategy – We are a Government Certified Women-Owned Business We practice Diversity Recruitment and Staffing for IT positions .. Because of our affiliations we have access to pools of resources among more diverse groups & individuals. We work with a large pool of minority professionals who specialize in IT skills. We are able to have access to these resources through our status as a D/MWBD firm and our affiliations. These affiliations assist us in working with resources among more diverse groups & individuals. We are also partnered with firms that are 8A certified as Minority firms, Disabled Veteran firms, Native American firms, Vietnam veteran firms, women owned firms. Our hub zone location keeps us close to the professional organizations of great diversity. We are active in recruiting from and networking with these community organizations of local IT professionals. This has given us access to a large pool of diversity talent. .. This is why Base One Technologies concentrates on diversity recruitment in the belief that a diverse team gives us a greater advantage in creating cutting edge solutions. … Information Security Planning is the process whereby an organization seeks to protect its operations and assets from data theft or computer hackers that seek to obtain unauthorized information or sabotage business operations. .. Key Clients Benefiting From Our Information Security Expertise: Pentagon Renovation Program, FAA, Citigroup, MCI. Base One Technologies .. Develops, implements and supports Information Security Counter measures such as honey-pots and evidence logging and incident documentation processes and solutions.”
“PHILADELPHIA and GREENWICH, Conn., June 4 /PRNewswire/ -- Starwood Capital Group [Serco provides a Bilderberg Honeypot Hotel Matrix service to Starwood] and Hersha Hospitality Management ("HHM") announced today that they have entered into an agreement that will provide Hersha the resources to expand its highly successful platform across the United States. The transaction brings together two of the best known names in the real estate and hotel sectors. Starwood Capital is one of the world's leading investment firms focused on real estate, having invested more than $24 billion in assets since its inception, while the privately held HHM is a leading third-party hotel management company operating more than 70 hotels in major metropolitan markets. Under the terms of the agreement, Starwood Capital has purchased a 49.9% stake in HHM, for an undisclosed amount.
The new partnership will seek to capitalize on the ongoing industry recovery by aggressively pursuing select-service and full-service hotel management opportunities on a national scale. In addition, the venture will also target strategic investments in turnaround and opportunistic select-service hotels throughout the country and full-service hotels in select suburban markets.
"We are very pleased to be partnering with HHM," said Barry Sternlicht, Chairman and CEO of Starwood Capital. "Over the years, we have built a close relationship with Hersha's leadership team and admire its best-in-class operating capabilities and ability to create value for the properties it manages. Starwood Capital will contribute capital, deal flow and enterprise-building resources to help leverage HHM's operating expertise across the country and across a broader spectrum of investments."
"Partnering HHM with Starwood Capital allows us to leverage the considerable strengths of both organizations," Naveen Kakarla, President and Chief Executive Officer of HHM said. "Barry Sternlicht and Starwood Capital Group have demonstrated keen judgment, innovative vision, and an unparalleled access to capital across several real estate cycles. HHM, I believe, has struck the fine balance between building a high quality multi-brand platform that is both scalable and process-oriented, while preserving a hands-on, entrepreneurial approach to managing hotels and projects."
HHM currently operates more than 70 hotels in metropolitan regions in Boston, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey,Philadelphia and Washington, D.C. The company provides turnkey management services for properties with leading brand affiliations, including Marriott, Hilton, Hyatt, Starwood and InterContinental Hotels Group and, for independent and boutique hotels [Duane Street Hotel]. The company's executive headquarters will remain in Philadelphia, PA and its operations and administrative headquarters will remain in Harrisburg, PA.
Starwood Capital Group is one of the world's leading private investment firms focused on real estate. In addition, Mr. Sternlicht is the founder of Starwood Hotels & Resorts, where he served as Chairman and CEO for nearly 10 years as the company grew into one of the world's leading hotel and leisure companies. Mr. Sternlicht also serves as the Chairman of Groupe du Louvre, which owns some the world's best-known luxury hotels, including the Crillon in Paris, and one of the world's largest budget hotel companies, Louvre Hotels, with more than 800 hotels across Europe. In addition, a controlled affiliate of Starwood Capital acquired Golden Tulip out of bankruptcy in 2009, adding a network of more than 230 hotels in almost 40 countries to its portfolio.
Starwood Capital Group
Starwood Capital Group is a private U.S. Based investment firm with a core focus on global real estate. Since the group's inception in 1991, the firm, through its various funds, has invested more than $24 billion in assets. Starwood employs approximately 150 people across 9 offices including Greenwich, San Francisco, Washington, D.C., Atlanta, London, Paris, Luxembourg, Mumbai and Tokyo. Starwood has invested in nearly every class of real estate on a global basis, including office, retail, multi-family, industrial, residential land, hotels, resorts, golf and senior housing assets. Starwood and its affiliates have successfully executed an investment strategy that includes building enterprises around core real estate portfolios in both the private and public markets and were responsible for the creation of Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, iStar Financial and Starwood Property Trust. Additional information about Starwood Capital may be found at www.starwoodcapital.com.
Hersha Hospitality Management
Hersha Hospitality Management operates more than 70 hotels in major metropolitan markets. The company provides turnkey management services, repositioning and renovation, and asset management services for properties across all hotel segments affiliated with Marriott, Hilton, Hyatt, Starwood and InterContinental Hotels Group and increasingly for independent boutique or lifestyle hotels. The company's clients include publicly traded companies, joint ventures, institutional real estate owners and private investors. Additional information about HHM may be found at www.hershahotels.com.
SOURCE Starwood Capital Group; Hersha Hospitality Management”
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