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Japan's Proposed National Security Legislation — Will This Be the End of Article 9? 国家安全保障基本法案九条の終焉か

The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol. 13, Issue. 24, No. 3, June 22, 2015

Lawrence Repeta

Champagne in Washington 

Japan is facing a constitutional crisis. The ruling coalition seeks to pass legislation that would overturn the nation's longstanding prohibition of "collective self-defense." Expert opinion is nearly unanimous that these proposals violate Article 9, the peace provision of Japan's Constitution. As of June 12, 2015, 225 constitutional scholars signed a public declaration condemning the bills as unconstitutional.(1) The list includes faculty members from every respected university in Japan. But never mind. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and his friends in Washington claim to know better.

Mr. Abe was the toast of the town in Washington in late April, when he was feted at a state dinner in the East Room of the White House with 200 guests. He also addressed a rare joint session of the Congress. The business end of Abe's visit included discussion of the Trans-Pacific Partnership and final agreement on a new set of guidelines governing joint U.S.-Japan joint defense operations. The new defense guidelines were lauded by American leaders in and out of the government. Defense Secretary Ashton B. Carter described the new guidelines as "a very big change from being locally focused to being globally focused."(2) The pre-existing version was geared exclusively toward the defense of Japan. The big change was the elimination of any geographic restriction, ostensibly committing Japan to join U.S. operations anywhere in the world.(3) In other words, Mr. Abe agreed to commit Japan to "collective self-defense."

To fulfill this commitment, Abe must either revise Article 9 of the Constitution or act in defiance of its longstanding restraints. In his every word and gesture on the topic, he expresses his determination to take the latter course. In view of popular opposition and the unified position of Japan's legal community, this action may cement Mr. Abe's reputation as a dangerous ultranationalist unrestrained by the law.

In the words of Professor Kobayashi Setsu of Keio University, enactment of the proposed legislation "would be the beginning of tyranny, that is a destruction of the rule of law."(4) In this article we will explore the grounds for the opinions of Professor Kobayashi and other scholars and the response of leaders of Japan’s ruling coalition.

A Bitter Brew in Tokyo

Is Japan's national policy decided in Tokyo – or Washington? The Prime Minister made his deal in Washington before submitting legislation to Japan’s national Diet. This seemed a minor detail at the time. The ruling coalition holds thumping majorities in both houses of the Diet, so passage of the national security bills would be a mere formality. Or so he thought.

The coast was clear when the Abe Cabinet submitted its package of bills to the Diet on May 15.5 These proposals would amend the Self-Defense Forces Act and make other changes that would authorize the deployment of Japan's Self-Defense Forces on missions outside of Japan and exercise military force in concert with foreign militaries even in cases where Japan is not under attack.

However, a lightning bolt struck on June 4 when three constitutional scholars appeared as expert witnesses before a Diet "constitution study" committee appointed to examine Abe’s plans to amend the Constitution. This committee was operating separately from the special committee appointed to consider the national security bills. Opposition Diet members naturally asked the experts to comment on the national security bills, the hottest constitutional issue of the day. The three men, professors of Waseda and Keio, generally regarded as Japan's most prestigious private universities, all testified that the proposed legislation violates Article 9.(6)

Three constitutional scholars--from left: Hasebe Yasuo, Kobayashi Setsu and Sasada Eiji--attend a session of the Lower House Commission on the Constitution on June 4. (The Asahi Shimbun)

Abe Administration leaders were blindsided. Prime Minister Abe himself was in Germany at G-7 Summit talks. When his second in command, the usually unflappable Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga Yoshihide was asked to respond to the professors' remarks, he blurted out "there are many other famous constitutional experts who support the government position."(7) As the nation would soon learn, Suga's statement was patently false.

The scholarly community lined up solidly behind their three colleagues. A formal declaration condemning the defense bills was issued at a press conference on June 3, the day before their testimony, with the names of 176 constitutional law professors attached.(8) This number has gradually increased since and numerous bar associations and citizens groups have issued similar declarations.(9)

The opposition of the experts made headlines and has remained a top news story since. Among the major news media, the popular nightly news television program Hodo Station attracted much attention with its independent survey of constitutional scholars. During its June 15 broadcast, Hodo Station announced the results. Among the 151 responses received, 127 scholars stated that the bills are unconstitutional; 19 said there are grounds to believe the bills may be constitutional, and only 3 said there is no constitutional violation.(10)

The Right Hand Knows Not…

Every news report on the June 4 testimony of the three scholars emphasized that one of them had been selected by members of the Prime Minister's own political party. This is Professor Hasebe Yasuo, a prolific scholar who served as a professor of constitutional law at the University of Tokyo from 1993 through 2014. Hasebe is so highly respected that when Todai launched its professional law school in 2004, he was appointed Dean. Hasebe joined Waseda University in 2014. If the LDP Dietmembers were seeking a solid professional opinion on the constitutionality of their proposals, they made a good choice.(1)

Hasebe was joined by Professors Sasada Eiji, also of Waseda, and Kobayashi Setsu, a constitutional law specialist who has taught at Keio University since 1974 and attained emeritus status in 2014. As reported by The Japan Times, in his June 4, 2015 testimony, Hasebe said: "Allowing the use of the right of collective self-defense cannot be explained within the framework of the basic logic of the past government views" of the Constitution, and that the government's reinterpretation of Article 9 "considerably damages legal stability and violates the Constitution." Sasada and Kobayashi made similar statements. Ironically, their appearance had no direct connection to the defense bill debate.

Throughout his career, Prime Minister Abe's highest priority has been his campaign to roll back the 1947 Constitution. He and his closest followers see the Constitution as a national humiliation, imposed on a defenseless Japan by foreign military forces in the immediate aftermath of World War II.(12) Since taking office in December 2012, Abe has repeatedly declared his intention to push this constitutional agenda forward, but the Diet has yet to receive an actual amendment proposal.

In preparation for this historic step, both houses of the Diet have appointed "constitution study" committees charged with discussing revision proposals. The lower house committee held its first meeting since the December 2014 election on May 7 under the chairmanship of veteran Diet member Funada Hajime. (Funada also serves as chair of the LDP headquarters on constitutional revision.) His assignment is to find common ground with opposition parties by putting forth uncontroversial proposals, such as adding constitutional protection for the environment, in order to prime the pump of constitutional change.(13)

Mr. Funada was expected to step softly, avoiding controversial topics -- especially collective self-defense. Public opinion polls show large majorities are opposed. For example, a recent Nippon Television survey showed 62.5% of respondents were opposed to the exercise of collective self-defense and 63.7% were against the enactment of the legislation in the current session of the Diet.(14) Directing the people's attention in this direction was anathema. Apparently, the hapless Mr. Funada did not foresee that committee members from opposition parties might not follow his script. In the aftermath of the June 4 incident, he announced that there will be no further meetings of the committee for the foreseeable future.(15)

The Scholars' Declaration

The Abe administration’s first act in this drama played in July 2014, when a Cabinet resolution declared a new interpretation of constitution Article 9 that would allow collective self-defense.(16) Scholars, bar associations, opposition politicians and others attacked the Cabinet resolution, but the controversy faded into the background until the scholars’ explosive testimony on June 4.

The first paragraph of Article 9 states that Japan "forever renounces war…and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes." The second paragraph states: "In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained."(17)

Throughout the postwar era, successive Cabinets have consistently interpreted these words to mean that Article 9 strictly limits the use of military force to Japan's own self-defense. For example, in a statement to the Diet in 1973, Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei said the government may use military force only when three conditions are present: “(1) Japan itself is under ongoing or imminent, unlawful attack emanating from abroad, (2) to terminate the attack, use of force is necessary, and (3) the extent of the use of force is proportionate to the end to be achieved."(18) Until July 1, 2014, all administrations rigorously held the line that Article 9 does not allow collective self-defense.

The scholars' June 3rd declaration attacks both the procedure through which the Abe administration acted and the substance of the bills it has placed before the Diet. Drafters of the declaration sought to present a few basic points in a manner that would attract the largest number of signatories. Accordingly, the declaration is brief and avoids detailed discussion of specific statutory language.

Regarding procedure, the scholars tell us that for more than sixty years successive Japanese governments have held the position that collective self-defense is prohibited by Article 9. They express outrage that a single Cabinet would presume to overturn this longstanding constitutional principle without Diet deliberations or thorough engagement with the Japanese people. They also point to the April 27 U.S.-Japan agreement on defense guidelines. According to the scholars, this purports to establish a "global U.S.-Japan alliance" which exceeds the bounds of the current U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. The Treaty itself contemplates military action only in cases of "armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan."(19) Moreover, on April 29, Prime Minister Abe told the joint session of the U.S. Congress that legislation would be passed "by the end of summer." According to the scholars, such tactics "trample" on the principle of popular sovereignty and treat the Diet, identified as the "highest organ of state power" in Constitution Article 41, as if it were nothing more than Abe's servant.

Of course, the true procedure for amending the Constitution is set forth in Article 96. So far Mr. Abe, in recognition of strong popular opposition, has disdained to follow the constitutional procedure.

Regarding the substance of the bills, the declaration homes in on three points:
First, according to the longstanding government position, Article 9 strictly limits the use of force to the defense of Japan. Among other things, the Abe proposals would authorize the exercise of military force under "conditions that threaten Japan's existence" (sonritsukikijitai). The scholars argue the legislation would replace the longstanding limitation with a standard that is vague and abstract, with no clear boundaries. Because the result could be exercise of military force that goes far beyond self-defense, they say the legislation violates Article 9.

Second, they condemn the bill’s authorization of logistical or "rear area support" (kōhōshien) for foreign military forces. They say this would enable SDF units to become components of a unified fighting force (ittaika). Any such operations not strictly in the defense of Japan would violate Article 9. They further note that the legislation would authorize such operations even in the absence of a United Nations resolution and that the Self-Defense Forces might take part in military operations that violate international law. Undoubtedly, the authors had the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq and other operations in the Middle East in mind.

Finally, they condemn language that would enable Self-Defense Forces to participate in an "allied army" (dōmeikoku) structure even in times of peace. They say that amendments to the Self-Defense Forces Act would enable the SDF to participate in joint patrolling and military exercises with U.S. and other foreign forces. Such "allied army" operations could lead to increased tensions with other countries and even to accidental confrontations that bring the risk of military escalation. Moreover, entrusting decisionmaking to military commanders on site at such confrontations would constitute the abdication of political responsibility.
This declaration has attracted the signatures of more than two hundred constitutional law professors. Needless to say, each and every one has particular thoughts about Article 9 and the proposed legislation. We can expect such thoughts to appear in many forms in the weeks to come. Their declaration is just a listing of points on which they all agreed in rapid fashion.

For the scholars, the answer is very clear. As it is presently written, Article 9 does not allow Japan's participation in the collective self-defense operations contemplated by the proposed legislation or by the new U.S.-Japan security guidelines. In order to lawfully authorize such action, the text of the Constitution itself must be revised.

The Government Response

In the aftermath of the scholars' attacks, government spokesmen have scrambled to find counter-arguments.

Their first assignment was to find support for Mr. Suga's comment that "many famous scholars" are aligned with the government. After a search proved largely fruitless, Mr. Suga abandoned this position. In an appearance before Mr. Funada's constitution study committee on June 10, he confessed that only ten scholars who support the government position had been found. He disclosed three names: Momochi Akira, a professor at Nihon University, Nagao Kazuhiro, professor emeritus of Chuo University, and Nishi Osamu, professor emeritus at Komazawa University.(20) Like Prime Minister Abe, these three men are all members of the ultranationalist group Nippon Kaigi, which advocates repeal of Article 9 and takes the position that Japan's imperial armies acted to protect China from western imperialists and other positions that glorify Japan's imperial history.(21) [AD note: Nationalism is a pretty good thing we think, but the Japanese variety historically has been a tenacious and as seen in history, can be a fanatical type of nationalism that is unique among nations. Japanese people themselves are peculiar in the sense that each Japanese is an individual microcosm of the macrocosm that is Japan as a country.]

A second response was delivered in the Diet the following day by LDP Vice President Komura Masahiko, a senior LDP politician who has filled important Cabinet roles, including Minister of Foreign Affairs, and is himself a lawyer. Komura made a two-pronged attack: first, the opinions of scholars are irrelevant, and second, the opinions of scholars cannot be trusted.(22)

On the first count, he stressed that binding interpretations of law are issued by judges, not scholars. Therefore, constitutionality of the government proposals must be considered in light of court precedent, not scholarly opinion. Unfortunately, there is only one Supreme Court precedent that addresses national defense, the 1959 Sunakawa decision. Although Komura sought to construct an argument in favor of collective self-defense based on this precedent, all parties are forced to concede that the Sunakawa decision did not address collective self-defense at all. We'll examine the Sunakawa precedent below.

As for the overall legitimacy of scholarly opinion, Mr. Komura reminded his listeners that back when the SDF was formed in the early 1950s and through much of its history, most scholars claimed the existence of the SDF itself violates Article 9. Komura scoffed at such ivory tower thinking. Important issues of national policy must not be entrusted to such dreamers. Today the SDF enjoys solid support among the Japanese people and obviously serves a most critical role in Japan's national defense.

Circumstances have changed

The strongest argument in favor of the government’s national security bills has nothing to do with law; it is a political argument. Prime Minister Abe and his seconds have ceaselessly repeated the refrain that Japan is in danger. Threats may emanate from North Korea, or China, or unidentified global terrorists, or somewhere else, but there is no time to be lost. To protect Japan from these threats, Japan must follow through on the promises made in Washington and pass legislation that confirms a national commitment to collective self-defense.

In order to support its legislative proposals, the Abe administration released a formal opinion (kenkai) on June 9 that argues collective self-defense is justified because attacks on other countries may threaten the security and even the existence of Japan. This opinion recognizes that another formal opinion issued by the Tanaka administration in 1972 reaches precisely the opposition conclusion: Article 9 prohibits collective self-defense. LDP spokespeople even attempt the Houdini trick of reconciling the two opposite conclusions.

The only apparent way to do so is to loudly declare that circumstances have changed and the Constitution must change with them. In the words of the government's June 9 opinion, "the national security environment surrounding Japan has fundamentally changed due to changes in the power balance and the rapid development of technological breakthroughs, the threat of weapons of mass destruction and other factors…"(23)

Of course, this may be true. But the Constitution is the supreme law of the land(24) and the words of Article 9, that the Japanese people "forever renounce war…and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes," remain unchanged. The interpretation that these words prohibit collective self-defense is very deeply entrenched. If the Abe administration's assessment of the threats and the appropriate response are correct, perhaps those words should be revised.(25)

The Sunakawa Judgment – A Red Herring

When LDP Vice-president Komura presented his defense on June 11, 2015 perhaps he was unaware that the head of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau (CLB), generally viewed as the most authoritative voice in the government on constitutional issues, had shot this down the day before. In response to questioning from an opposition party Diet member on June 10, CLB Chief Yokobatake Yusuke had agreed that the Sunakawa judgment "does not touch upon collective self-defense."(26)

The Sunakawa decision itself was born of a constitutional crisis of another day. That case involved the prosecution of protesters who broke through fencing at a U.S. military base on the western outskirts of Tokyo in 1957. One charge against the protesters involved a special statute which applies only to trespass on U.S. military bases. Defense lawyers argued that this charge should be dismissed because the statute itself was unconstitutional. Why? Because the presence of U.S. military forces in Japan constitutes "war potential" prohibited by Article 9 and therefore, both the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and the special statute are unconstitutional.

Government prosecutors were stunned by a March 1959 Tokyo District Court judgment that agreed with this reasoning and dismissed charges filed under the special statute. With this decision, Chief Judge Date Akio earned a secure place in Japan’s legal history. The court's action will forever be known among Japanese lawyers as the "Date Judgment."

Of course, the decision was appealed. But it was the midst of the Cold War and the Date Judgment struck at the core of Japan’s defense policy and the U.S. military strategy in Asia. The case required special care.

Government lawyers bypassed the ordinary appellate court, filing a special appeal directly with the Supreme Court. Many years later, documents preserved in the U.S. National Archives would reveal that Chief Justice Tanaka Kotaro consulted with U.S. government officials in deciding how to manage the case.(27) Ultimately, Tanaka persuaded his colleagues to go along in a judgment issued just nine months later that overturned the District Court.

The Supreme Court's majority opinion expressed two separate grounds for its decision. First, the Court said that the prohibition on "war potential" in the second paragraph of Article 9 applies only to Japan's own forces; it does not prohibit the presence of foreign military forces in Japan that are not under the "command and supervision" of Japan. Second, the Court created a "political question doctrine." The presence of U.S. military forces in Japan is authorized by the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. The District Court reached its judgment by declaring the Treaty and therefore criminal prosecutions under the special statute unconstitutional. The Supreme Court held that the Security Treaty "is featured with an extremely high degree of political consideration," and therefore "unless the said Treaty is obviously unconstitutional and void," decisions concerning its constitutionality should be left to the Cabinet and the Diet and "ultimately to the political consideration of the people, with whom rests the sovereign power of the nation."(28) The Court has not employed this political question doctrine since.

The current fight over the government's national security bills has nothing to do with the grounds for the Supreme Court’s 1959 decision. Instead, it concerns the Court's statement that "there is nothing in Article 9 which would deny the right of self-defense inherent in our nation as a sovereign power."29 This is generally accepted as the only occasion on which the Court has expressly declared that Article 9 allows Japan to engage in self-defense.

Although the facts of the case did not concern "collective self-defense" and the Court's published opinion said nothing about it, this is the language seized upon by Mr. Komura and other LDP spokesmen who have laid claim to the Sunakawa decision as the foundation for the national security bills and the U.S.-Japan guidelines.(30)

Washington's Power Over Japan's National Security Policy

The genesis of Article 9 is found in the post-war occupation. Occupation authorities insisted that Japan's new Constitution include an anti-war clause. Final language was approved by Japan's Diet in 1946 and took effect the following year. It has never been changed.

By 1950, the U.S. was at war in Korea and American leaders had second thoughts about this anti-war provision. From that point until the present, the U.S. government has continuously applied pressure on Japan to put aside Article 9 and join U.S. military operations abroad. Most famously, as President George W. Bush launched war in Iraq, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage insisted to his Japanese counterparts that they "put boots on the ground."(31) Then-Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro complied, ordering a small force to Iraq despite complaints about the constitutionality of such action.

Another unprecedented court decision addressed the constitutionality of Mr. Koizumi's action. This was a 2008 judgment of the Nagoya High Court. Although the Court decided it was obliged to dismiss the case for lack of standing,(32) it nonetheless took the occasion to deliver its opinion on the constitutionality of SDF actions in the Iraq War theater. The Court was concerned not with the heavily-publicized humanitarian activities at Samawah, but instead with Air Self-Defense flights carrying armed forces in and out of Baghdad. In the Court's words, "In modern warfare, supply activities, such as transport, are an important part of combat activities. ASDF airlifts of armed soldiers in the multinational force to the Baghdad combat zone were acts that could be identified as being involved in the use of force by other nations and the ASDF could be said to have conducted use-of-force actions itself."(33) In the Court's opinion, these actions violated Article 9. These are precisely the kinds of "rear support activities" proposed by LDP spokesmen and identified as unconstitutional by the scholars' declaration of June 2015.(34)

The guidelines agreed in Washington on April 27, 2015 comprise the latest chapter in the saga of American interference in Japan's constitutional processes. The invitation to Mr. Abe to make his proclamation in Washington rather than Japan's own capital shows a disturbing callousness and disregard for Japan's sovereignty. It were as if the Washington mandarins were acting out the very script set out in Gavan McCormack's "Client State" and other writings that describe the extreme servility of LDP politicians to American keepers.(35) Regarding security policy and the rule of law, McCormack writes, "The world's most democratic constitution was put in place, but in practice was subordinate to the security treaty with the U.S."(36) In this case, on April 27 Abe and his American friends went even beyond the treaty by making a deal that it does not authorize.

Constitutional Crisis

We are witnessing a severe test for constitutional democracy in Japan. Given the clarity and near-unanimity of the experts' opinions, it seems highly unlikely that the Abe administration can make any compelling legal argument to support its position. If Abe goes ahead, the message that his action defies the constitution will be pounded home ceaselessly in lecture halls and articles published in all forms of the media. Abe's legacy as the man who abandoned the rule of law will be fixed.

Lawrence Repeta is a professor of law at Meiji University in Japan, an Asia-Pacific Journal contributing editor, and a director of Information Access Japan Clearinghouse. He is author of "Limiting Fundamental Rights Protection in Japan – the Role of the Supreme Court," in Critical Issues in Contemporary Japan, edited by Jeff Kingston (Routledge, 2014), "Reserved Seats on Japan's Supreme Court," (Washington University Law Review, 2011) and other writings on Japan's constitution and legal system.

Recommended citation: Lawrence Repeta, "Japan's Proposed National Security Legislation — Will This be the end of Article 9?

The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol. 13, Issue. 24, No. 3, June 22, 2015

Related articles:

• Lawrence Repeta, A New State Secrecy Law for Japan?

• Craig Martin, "The Case Against Revising Interpretations of the Japanese Constitution"

• Miyazaki Hayao, "Constitutional Amendment is Out of the Question"

• Herbert P. Bix, "Abe Shinzo and the U.S.-Japan Relationship in a Global Context"

• C. Douglas Lummis, "It Would Make No Sense for Article 9 to Mean What it Says, Therefore It Doesn't: The Transformation of Japan's Constitution"

Lawrence Repeta, "Japan's Democracy at Risk - The LDP's Ten Most Dangerous Proposals for Constitutional Change"


1 The text of the scholars' declaration and list of signatories is available here.

2 See Julie Hirschfeld Davis and Michael R. Gordon, "Japan and US set new rules for military cooperation", The New York Times, April 27, 2015.

3 The text of the guidelines are available here.

4 Remarks at a press conference, Foreign Correspondents Club of Japan, June 15, 2015.

5 See here.

6 See here and here. Professor Setsu Kobayashi of Keio University scoffed, "There are hundreds of constitutional scholars in Japan. There are about two or three who would say the law is constitutional."

Asahi Shimbun, June 5, 2015, p. 4, Japanese edition. (Translated by Lawrence Repeta)

7 Asahi Shimbun, June 11, p.2.

8 The text of the scholars' declaration and list of signatories is available here. Individual scholars can be expected to blast the government proposals at every opportunity. E.g., (more scholars say bills are unconstitutional). See here.

9 A declaration by the Japan Civil Liberties Union was released on June 12. It is available here.

10 The scholars' declarations have been followed by similar statements from bar associations and citizen groups all over the country. A statement opposing the bills was issued by the national bar association on May 14, the day the bills were approved by the Cabinet. Text (in Japanese) available here.

11 The LDP also selected Professor Hasebe to testify on behalf of the State Secrets Act in 2013. He supported the bill.

12 The most comprehensive statement of the LDP plan for an "autonomous Constitution" free of the taint of foreign influence appears in a document issued by the Party on April 28, 2012, a date selected to commemorate the sixtieth anniversary of the end of the postwar occupation. See Lawrence Repeta, "Japan's Democracy at Risk – The LDP's Ten Most Dangerous Proposals for Constitutional Change," The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol. 11, Issue 28, No. 3, July 15, 2013.

13 "LDP sets out constitutional amendment strategy; DPJ, Komeito preach caution," May 08, 2015.

14 Linda Sieg, "Abe's support rate lowest since taking office in 2012," Thomson Reuters, June 15, 2015.

15 憲法審、当面開かぬ=自民・船田氏 June 19, 2015; 論戦安保法制 自民党国対、憲法審査会の“凍結”要請 2015.6.16 19:09

16 Martin and Wakefield, here.

17 An English text of the Japanese Constitution is available here: add URL. And give J text URL too.

18 Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka’s statement to the Diet on Sept. 23, 1973, English text from Hasebe Yasuo, "A memorandum for the Foreign Correspondents Club," distributed on June 15, 2015.



毎日新聞 2015年06月10日 23時05分(最終更新 06月11日 11時18分)

21 According to a 2014 US Congressional Research Service Report, positions advocated by Nippon Kaigi Kyokai include "Japan should be applauded for liberating much of East Asia from Western colonial powers, that the 1946-1948 Tokyo War Crimes tribunals were illegitimate, and that the killings by Imperial Japanese troops during the 1937 'Nanjing massacre' were exaggerated or fabricated." CRS, "Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress," Feb. 20, 2014, available here. Quoted in Norihiro Kato, "Tea Party Politics in Japan -- Japan's Rising Nationalism," The New York Times, Sept. 12, 2014. According to the Economist, Nippon Kaigi members "applaud Japan's wartime 'liberation' of East Asia from Western colonialism; rebuild the armed forces; inculcate patriotism among students brainwashed by left-wing teachers; and revere the emperor as he was worshipped in the good old days before the war," "Right side up," The Economist, June 6, 2015, and here.

22 See here.

23 Summary of Opinion (kenkai) of Japan Government, June 9, 2015, Asahi Shimbun, June 10, 2015, p.7.

24 Constitution, Article 98.

25 Procedures for revision are set forth in Constitution Article 96.

26 Asahi Shimbun, June 11, 2015, p.2.

27 See, e.g., "Supreme Court chief justice tipped off U.S. diplomats in 1959," The Asahi Shimbun, April 09, 2013. For additional analysis, see Craig Martin, "U.S. Interference in Japanese Constitutional Case,"

After these disclosures, several of the Sunakawa defendants filed a request for retrial on the ground that U.S. interference had denied them the right to a fair trial. See "Chance for court to right a wrong," Japan Times, June 23, 2014

28 Thus, the Court waived authority to pass on the constitutionality of this particular Treaty but warned that it would exercise such authority in cases it considered "obviously unconstitutional and void." All quotations are from Theodore McNelly (ed.) Sources in Modern East Asian History and Politics (Meredith Corp., 1967), pp. 198-99.

29 Sakata v. Japan, 13 Keishu 3225, Supreme Court Judgment of Dec. 16, 1959, McNelly, ibid., p. 196.

30 On June 13, surviving lawyers who defended the Sunakawa defendants six decades ago held a press conference of their own in which they repeated the message that the Sunakawa court did not address collective self-defense. 砂川事件弁護団 再び声明 合憲主張「国民惑わす強弁」June 13, 2015.

31 Richard Armitage, Remarks at Tokyo Press Roundtable, June 9, 2003. Cited in Michael Penn, Japan and the War on Terror – Military Force and Political Pressure in the U.S.-Japan Alliance, (I.B. Tauris, 2014). Penn's book is a masterful account of the pressure applied by American "alliance managers" demanding that Japan join the war in Iraq, the servile attitude of Japanese officials and the eagerness of Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro and other nationalist politicians to join the war.

32 In the June 15 press conference at the Foreign Correspondents Club, Professor Kobayashi notified the audience that lawyers were preparing suits to be filed on the day the national security legislation is passed. Due to stringent standing requirements created by Japan's Supreme Court, nearly any such suit will be dismissed. See Martin

33 Quoted in Penn, at p. 270.

34 See Penn, pp. 269-74 for a discussion of the Nagoya High Court decision.

35 Gavan McCormack, Client State – Japan in the American Embrace (Verso 2007).

36 Ibid., p. 191.

This article appeared
at Sputnick

Tokyo, London Want Plan to Gang Up Against Beijing?

August 8, 2015

During negotiations in Tokyo on Saturday, foreign ministers of Japan and Great Britain agreed to strengthen their cooperation and withstand China's activities in the disputed waters of the South China Sea.

Both countries agreed to strengthen cooperation on the maintenance of the "rule of law" in Asia with regard to China's "alarming" activities in the region, Yonhap News Agency reported on Saturday.

China’s activities in the disputed waters of the South China raise concerns in Western countries and Japan. Therefore, Japan intends to work closely with the UK to eliminate challenges the international community is facing, Japanese Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida said at a joint press conference with his British counterpart.

An aerial file photo taken though a glass window of a Philippine military plane shows the alleged on-going land reclamation by China on mischief reef in the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, west of Palawan, Philippines, May 11, 2015

In the upcoming meeting of foreign ministers and defense ministers of the two countries which will be held in the "two plus two" format, Kishida and UK Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Philip Hammond are planning to discuss ways to promote joint research in the field of missile technology and military equipment.

Despite the fact that Japan does not have any territorial claims in the South China Sea, the country is concerned about the construction of seven Chinese artificial islands in the territorial waters of the Spratly archipelago. These islands will help China strengthen its military presence in the sea, which, according to Kishida, may pose significant danger to the majority of the Japanese merchant ships.

In the economic sphere, both ministers also reaffirmed the willingness of Japan and the EU to step up negotiations towards a free trade agreement by the end of 2015.

This article appeared 
at Zero Hedge

Be Afraid: Japan Is About To Do Something That's Never Been Done Before

Submitted by Tyler Durden on 08/08/2015 13:15 -0400

When the words "mothballed", "nuclear", and "never been done before" are seen together with Japan in a sentence, the world should be paying attention...

As TEPCO officials face criminal charges over the lack of preparedness with regard Fukushima, and The IAEA Report assigns considerable blame to the Japanese culture of "over-confidence & complacency," Bloomberg reports,
Japan is about to do something that's never been done before: Restart a fleet of mothballed nuclear reactors.

The first reactor to meet new safety standards could come online as early as next week. Japan is reviving its nuclear industry four years after all its plants were shut for safety checks following the earthquake and tsunami that wrecked the Fukushima Dai-Ichi station north of Tokyo, causing radiation leaks that forced the evacuation of 160,000 people.

Mothballed reactors have been turned back on in other parts of the world, though not on this scale -- 25 of Japan's 43 reactors have applied for restart permits. One lesson learned elsewhere is that the process rarely goes smoothly. Of 14 reactors that resumed operations after four years offline, all had emergency shutdowns and technical failures, according to data from the World Nuclear Association, an industry group.

"If reactors have been offline for a long time, there can be issues with long-dormant equipment and with 'rusty' operators," Allison Macfarlane, a former chairman of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, said by e-mail.
In case you are not worried enough yet...
As problems can arise with long-dormant reactors, the NRA "should be testing all the equipment as well as the operator beforehand in preparation," Macfarlane of the U.S. said by e-mail. Although the NRA "is a new agency, many of the staff there have long experience in nuclear issues," she said.

Kyushu Electric has performed regular checks since the reactor was shut to ensure it restarts and operates safely, said a company spokesman, who asked not to be identified because of company policy.

"If a car isn't used for a while, and you suddenly use it, then there is usually a problem. There is definitely this type of worry with Sendai," said Ken Nakajima, a professor at Kyoto University Research Reactor Institute. "Kyushu Electric is probably thinking about this as well and preparing for it."
It's not the first time a nation has tried this..
In Sweden, E.ON Sverige AB closed the No. 1 unit at its Oskarshamn plant in 1992 and restarted it in 1996.

It had six emergency shutdowns in the following year and a refueling that should have taken 38 days lasted more than four months after cracks were found in equipment.
* * *
Good luck Japan

This information appeared 
at Spitfire List

FTR #689 Interview with Sterling and Peggy Seagrave

Posted by Dave Emory ⋅ October 13, 2009

Tags Bush Family, CIA, Cover-Up, Disinformation, Drug Trafficking, Dulles, Economic Bailout, FDR, Ford-Gerald, GOP, Harry Truman, Japan, MacArthur, Money Laundering, Nixon, Offshore, Operation Golden Lily, Pearl Harbor, Reagan, Sullivan and Cromwell, The M-Fund, UBS, Wall Street

MP3 Side 1 | Side 2

Intro­duc­tion: High­light­ing their con­sum­mately impor­tant book Gold War­riors; the pro­gram proudly presents Ster­ling and Peggy Sea­grave.

Pur­su­ing the sub­ject of the fab­u­lous amount of wealth stolen by the Japan­ese dur­ing World War II under Golden Lily (the for­mal name of the Japan­ese loot­ing pro­gram), this broad­cast sup­ple­ments dis­cus­sion pre­sented in FTR#'s 428, 446, 451, 501, 509. Hav­ing secreted over $100-billion (in 1940's dol­lars) worth of pre­cious met­als and gems in the Philip­pines alone, the Japan­ese post­war eco­nomic largess was founded largely on the plun­der gar­nered from their rape of Asia.

The pro­gram and the inter­view begin with the story of one of the more impor­tant post­war US intel­li­gence operatives–former OSS and CIA agent Sev­erino Diaz Gar­cia Santa Romana-nicknamed "Santy." The dis­cov­erer of much of the gold hid­den in the Philip­pines by Prince Chichibu and Gen­eral Yamashita under "Golden Lily", Santa Romana worked with Gen­eral Edward Lans­dale to secret the gold into for­eign bank accounts. There, it was sub­se­quently uti­lized for a num­ber of pur­poses, in par­tic­u­lar the financ­ing of post­war US intel­li­gence oper­a­tions. As the Sea­graves explain, a piv­otal event in the recov­ery of the Philip­pines Golden Lily caches was the tor­ture of Gen­eral Yamashita’s dri­ver, who even­tu­ally yielded the where­abouts of the repositories.

Among other uses, the recov­ered gold was used to finance covert oper­a­tions and pur­chase polit­i­cal alle­giance dur­ing the Cold War. In addi­tion to being used to res­ur­rect the very mil­i­tarists, fas­cists and oli­garchs that had pros­e­cuted Japan's war of aggres­sion, the monies were com­bined with trea­sure recov­ered from the Nazis to cre­ate an enor­mous slush fund called the Black Eagle trust. This huge repos­i­tory of clan­des­tine wealth was used to sta­bi­lize the post­war finan­cial sys­tem, finance covert oper­a­tions, and pur­chase influ­ence among America's Cold War allies. Con­ceived of, and real­ized, by some of the most pow­er­ful Amer­i­can polit­i­cal and finan­cial power bro­kers, the Black Eagle trust ulti­mately became a source of enor­mous cor­rup­tion, as it became a "Trea­sure of the Sierra Madre", lur­ing many indi­vid­u­als and insti­tu­tions into temp­ta­tion and, some­times, death.

A fright­en­ing reminder of the inse­cu­rity sur­round­ing the cen­ters of great wealth can be found in the chill­ing sto­ries of Nor­bert Schlei, W.R. "Cot­ton" Jones', Santy's heirs and Aus­tralian bro­ker Peter John­ston who attempted to law­fully nego­ti­ate or ver­ify finan­cial instru­ments influ­enced by Golden Lily wealth. Ter­ror and death can be the rewards for rec­ti­tude. Many of the insti­tu­tions bailed out by the U.S. Tax­payer in the wake of the finan­cial melt­down in 2008 have vast amounts of stolen gold hid­den away from the pry­ing eyes of regulators.

Pro­gram High­lights Include: The estab­lish­ment and oper­a­tion of the M-Fund—designed to estab­lish and per­pet­u­ate the Japan­ese reac­tionar­ies who had engi­neered Japan's war of aggres­sion; the Yot­suya Fund—designed to finance the coer­cion, intim­i­da­tion and mur­der of the polit­i­cal oppo­si­tion in Japan; the Keenan Fund—set up to bribe wit­nesses in order to white­wash Japan­ese war crim­i­nals; Kodama Yoshio—Japanese admi­ral, gang­ster and the CIA's main man in post­war Japan; the Showa Trust—set up to enrich Emperor Hiro­hito; the Mar­cos regime in the Philip­pines and its attempts at manip­u­lat­ing both the Japan­ese and Amer­i­can ben­e­fi­cia­ries of the Golden Lily; the Rea­gan administration's attempts at using Golden Lily loot in the Philip­pines in order to ease the US back on to the Gold Stan­dard; the careers of Black Eagle trust archi­tects Henry Stim­son, John J. McCloy, Robert Lovett and Robert B. Ander­son; review of the career and fas­cist ide­ol­ogy of Gen­eral Charles Willoughby, MacArthur's intel­li­gence chief; Richard Nixon's deci­sion to turn one of the aggre­gates of Golden Lily over to Japan­ese war crim­i­nal (and later Prime Min­is­ter) Kishi Nobo­suke. Nixon agreed to turn the M-Fund over to Kishi in exchange for kick­backs to Nixon's 1960 pres­i­den­tial bid.

1. The pro­gram and the inter­view begin with the story of the more impor­tant post­war US intel­li­gence operatives–former OSS and CIA agent Sev­erino Diaz Gar­cia Santa Romana-nicknamed "Santy." The dis­cov­erer of much of the gold hid­den in the Philip­pines by Prince Chichibu and Gen­eral Yamashita under "Golden Lily", Santa Romana worked with Gen­eral Edward Lans­dale to secret the gold into for­eign bank accounts. There, it was sub­se­quently uti­lized for a num­ber of pur­poses, in par­tic­u­lar the financ­ing of post­war US intel­li­gence oper­a­tions. As the Sea­graves explain, a piv­otal event in the recov­ery of the Philip­pines Golden Lily caches was the tor­ture of Gen­eral Yamashita's dri­ver, who even­tu­ally yielded the where­abouts of the repositories.

Among other uses, the recov­ered gold was used to finance covert oper­a­tions and puchase polit­i­cal alle­giance dur­ing the Cold War. Among the most impor­tant of the vehi­cles that emerged from the looted wealth was the Black Eagle Trust.

Among the prin­ci­pal coor­di­nat­ing ele­ments assist­ing Santa Romana and his U.S. asso­ciates was the Vat­i­can and the Opus Dei net­work, in particular.

In addi­tion to its tac­ti­cal appli­ca­tion to covert oper­a­tions and polit­i­cal influ­ence pend­ing, the Black Eagle Trust estab­lished the gilded loot of the Sec­ond World War at the foun­da­tion of the post­war eco­nomic and polit­i­cal order!

2. In this con­text, the pro­gram high­lights the use of this wealth to finance covert oper­a­tions and buy polit­i­cal influ­ence dur­ing the Cold War.
"The treasure—gold, plat­inum, and bar­rels of loose gems—was com­bined with Axis loot recov­ered in Europe to cre­ate a world­wide covert polit­i­cal action fund to fight com­mu­nism. This 'black gold' gave the Tru­man Admin­is­tra­tion access to vir­tu­ally lim­it­less unvouchered funds for covert oper­a­tions. It also pro­vided an asset base that was used by Wash­ing­ton to rein­force the trea­suries of its allies, to bribe polit­i­cal lead­ers, and to manip­u­late elec­tions in for­eign coun­tries. In the late 1940's, this agenda was seen as entirely jus­ti­fied, because the Soviet Union was aggres­sively sup­port­ing com­mu­nist and social­ist move­ments all over the world, putting the sur­vival of the cap­i­tal­ist world in peril."
(Gold Warriors—America's Secret Recov­ery of Yamashita's Gold; by Ster­ling Sea­grave and Peggy Sea­grave; p. 3.)

3 "Most read­ers will be as sur­prised as we were by this infor­ma­tion. Some may be deeply trou­bled by Truman’s strate­gic deci­sion, which oth­ers may heartily endorse. It is not within the scope of this book to exam­ine that deci­sion, or to explore whether it was right or wrong. It might have been a wise deci­sion at the time, which had tragic con­se­quences in the longer term. Ours is only a pre­lim­i­nary report, and in what fol­lows we try to remain polit­i­cally neu­tral. The only pur­pose of this book is to lift the veil of secrecy, and to bring for­ward and exam­ine the unfore­seen con­se­quences, which are many, and troubling."


4. The deci­sion to form this vast action fund of Axis trea­sure looted dur­ing World War II (called the Black Eagle trust) had its gen­e­sis with the Bret­ton Woods con­fer­ence of 1944 and involved some of the key power bro­kers in the Amer­i­can power elite.
"It was not Truman’s deci­sion alone. The idea for a global polit­i­cal action fund based on war loot actu­ally orig­i­nated dur­ing the Roo­sevelt admin­is­tra­tion, with Sec­re­tary of War Henry L. Stim­son. Dur­ing the war, Stim­son had a brain­trust think­ing hard about Axis plun­der and how it should be han­dled when peace came. As the tide turned against the Axis, it was only a mat­ter of time before trea­sure began to be recov­ered. Much of this war prize was in the form of gold looted by the Nazis from con­quered coun­tries and civil­ian vic­tims. To elim­i­nate any trace of orig­i­nal own­er­ship, the Nazis had melted it down, and recast it as ingots hall­marked with the swastika and black eagle of the Reichs­bank. There were other rea­sons why the gold was dif­fi­cult to trace. Many of the orig­i­nal own­ers had died, and pre-war gov­ern­ments had ceased to exist. East­ern Europe was falling under the con­trol of the Soviet Union, so return­ing gold looted there was out of the question."
(Ibid.; p. 4.)

5. These lumi­nar­ies included Sec­re­tary of War Henry Stim­son and his aides John J. McCloy, Robert Lovett and Robert B. Ander­son, about whom more will be said later on in the pro­gram. The ref­er­ence to "Santy" is to Mr. Santa Romana.
"Stimson’s spe­cial assis­tants on this topic were his deputies John J. McCloy and Robert Lovett, and con­sul­tant Robert B. Ander­son, all clever men with out­stand­ing careers in pub­lic ser­vice and bank­ing. McCloy later became head of the World Bank, Lovett sec­re­tary of Defense, Ander­son sec­re­tary of the Trea­sury. Their solu­tion was to set up what is infor­mally called the Black Eagle trust. The idea was first dis­cussed with America's allies in secret dur­ing July 1944, when forty-four nations met at Bret­ton Woods, New Hamp­shire, to plan the post­war world econ­omy. (This was con­firmed, in doc­u­ments we obtained, by a num­ber of high-level sources, includ­ing a CIA offi­cer based in Manila, and for­mer CIA Deputy Direc­tor Ray Cline, who knew of Santy's recov­er­ies in 1945. As recently as the 1990’s, Cline con­tin­ued to be involved in attempts to con­trol Japan­ese war-gold still in the vaults of Citibank.)"

6. Next, the pro­gram high­lights the machi­na­tions of Edward Lans­dale, one of the most impor­tant US "Black Ops" vet­er­ans of the Cold War. Lans­dale was at the epi­cen­ter of the recov­ery of the Philip­pines trea­sure sites cre­ated by the Japan­ese and opened by Santa Romana. Lans­dale briefed the high-ranking gov­ern­ment offi­cials (includ­ing Gen­eral Dou­glas MacArthur) who par­tic­i­pated in the coop­tion of the Philip­pines trea­sure sites.
"After brief­ing Pres­i­dent Tru­man and oth­ers in Wash­ing­ton, includ­ing McCloy, Lovett, and Stim­son, Cap­tain Lans­dale returned to Tokyo in Novem­ber 1945 with Robert B. Ander­son. Gen­eral MacArthur then accom­pa­nied Ander­son and Lans­dale on a covert flight to Manila, where they set out for a tour of the vaults Santy already had opened. In them, we were told, Ander­son and MacArthur strolled down 'row after row of gold bars stacked two meters tall'. From what they saw, it was evi­dent that over a period of years Japan had looted many bil­lions of dol­lars in trea­sure from all over Asia. What was seen by Ander­son and MacArthur was only the gold that had not reached Japan. Far from being bank­rupted by the war, Japan had been greatly enriched."

7. Ulti­mately, the very clan­des­tine nature of the "Black Gold" (includ­ing the Black Eagle trust and other off-the-books funds to be dis­cussed later) led to the per­ver­sion of the use of these monies (which may have been jus­ti­fied dur­ing the early Cold War and the Soviet expan­sion­ist period). These clan­des­tine monies became the source of immense and ongo­ing corruption.
"Because the Black Eagle trust and the polit­i­cal action funds it spawned remained off the books, some of these slush funds fell into the wrong hands, where they remain to this day, big­ger than ever. Accord­ing to reli­able sources in Wash­ing­ton and Tokyo, in 1960 Vice Pres­i­dent Nixon gave one of the biggest of these funds, the M-Fund, to the lead­ers of Japan’s Lib­eral Demo­c­ra­tic Party in return for their promise of kick­backs to Nixon’s cam­paign for the Amer­i­can pres­i­dency. This in itself is deeply dis­turb­ing. But the M-Fund, then worth $35-billion and now said to be worth upwards of $500-billion, has been con­trolled ever since by LDP king­mak­ers who use it to buy elec­tions, to keep Japan a one-party dic­ta­tor­ship, and to block any mean­ing­ful reforms. Sim­i­lar abuses with other secret funds are to be found all over the world. Secrecy is power. Power cor­rupts. Secret power cor­rupts secretly."
(Ibid.; p. 6.)

8. "As Japan expert Chalmers John­son nicely put it, 'The Cold War is over. What­ever the United States may have believed was nec­es­sary to pros­e­cute the Cold War, the Cold War itself can no longer be used to jus­tify igno­rance about its costs and unin­tended con­se­quences. The issue today is not whether Japan might veer toward social­ism or neu­tral­ism but why the gov­ern­ment that evolved from its long period of depen­dence on the United States is so cor­rupt, inept and weak.'"


9a. Return­ing to the sub­ject of the Santa Romana recov­er­ies in the Philip­pines at the end of the war, the broad­cast fleshes out the oper­a­tion, involv­ing Santa Romana, MacArthur, Lans­dale and Robert B. Anderson.
"What we do know, from two sep­a­rate high-level sources in the CIA, is that Robert B. Ander­son flew back to Tokyo with Lans­dale, for dis­cus­sions with MacArthur. After some days of meet­ings, MacArthur and Ander­son flew secretly to Manila, where they were taken by Lans­dale and Santy to some of the sites in the moun­tains, and to six other sites around Aparri at the north­ern tip of Luzon. In the inter­ven­ing weeks, Santy's men, aided by hand-picked teams from the U.S. Army Corps of Engi­neers, had suc­cess­fully opened sev­eral of these vaults, where MacArthur and Ander­son were able to stroll down row after row of gold bars. Other sites were opened in sub­se­quent months. In all, the recov­er­ies took two years to com­plete, from late 1945 to early 1947."
(Ibid.; p. 96.)

9b. "From what was seen in these vaults, and also dis­cov­ered by U.S. Army inves­ti­ga­tors in Japan, it became evi­dent that over a period of decades Japan had looted bil­lions of dol­lars' worth of gold, plat­inum, dia­monds, and other trea­sure, from all over East and South­east Asia. Much of this had reached Japan by sea, or over­land from China through Korea, but a lot had been hid­den in the Philippines."


10. As men­tioned above, the Santa Romana recov­er­ies and other Japan­ese loot was com­bined with Nazi gold recov­ered at the end of the war in Europe. These bul­lion trea­suries were com­bined to form the Black Eagle trust. As dis­cussed above, some of the pre­mier mem­ber of the U.S. power elite over­saw the cre­ation of Black Eagle.
"Washington's 'offi­cial' (pub­lic) fig­ure for recov­ered Nazi gold still is only 550 met­ric tons. But Ander­son knew bet­ter. One of his busi­ness asso­ciates saw pho­tos in Anderson’s office of an Amer­i­can sol­dier 'sit­ting on top of stacks of bul­lion that Hitler had stolen from Poland, Aus­tria, Bel­gium and France. It ended up with the Allied high com­mand and no one was allowed to talk about it.' The same source said he was taken to the court­yard of a con­vent in Europe where 11,200 met­ric tons of Nazi looted bul­lion had been collected."

11. "After the Nazi defeat, the OSS and other Allied intel­li­gence orga­ni­za­tions searched Ger­many and Aus­tria for art trea­sures and looted gold. Soviet troops and spe­cial units did the same in the Russ­ian zone. More is known of what hap­pened to the recov­ered art than to the recov­ered gold. When one hun­dred tons of Nazi gold were recov­ered from a salt mine near Merk­ers, Ger­many, the truck con­voy car­ry­ing it to Frank­furt van­ished; it was said to have been hijacked, but the more likely expla­na­tion is that this gold was among the bul­lion stacked in the con­vent courtyard."


12. "The rea­son for all this dis­cre­tion was a top secret project some­times called Black Eagle, a strat­egy first sug­gested to Pres­i­dent Roo­sevelt by Sec­re­tary of War Henry L. Stim­son and his wartime advi­sors, John J. McCloy (later head of the World Bank), Robert Lovett (later sec­re­tary of Defense), and Robert B. Ander­son (later sec­re­tary of the Trea­sury). Stim­son pro­posed using all recov­ered Axis war loot (Nazi, Fas­cist, and Japan­ese) to finance a global polit­i­cal action fund. Because it would be dif­fi­cult if not impos­si­ble to deter­mine who were the right­ful own­ers of all the looted gold, bet­ter to keep its recov­ery quiet and set up a trust to help friendly gov­ern­ments stay in power after the war. This was infor­mally called the Black Eagle trust after the Ger­man black eagle, refer­ring to Nazi bul­lion marked with an eagle and swastika, recov­ered from under­ground vaults of the Reichsbank."

(Ibid.; pp. 96–97.)

13. Appar­ently, some of the pre­mier fam­i­lies in inter­na­tional finance col­lab­o­rated with the for­ma­tion and oper­a­tion of the Black Eagle trust, as well.
"Accord­ing to some sources, the Black Eagle trust could only have been set up with the coop­er­a­tion of the most pow­er­ful bank­ing fam­i­lies in Amer­ica and Europe, includ­ing the Rock­e­fellers, Har­ri­mans, Roth­schilds, Oppen­heimers, War­burgs, and others."
(Ibid.; p. 97.)

14. Flesh­ing out infor­ma­tion about the archi­tects of the Black Eagle trust, the pro­gram sets forth the back­ground of Henry Stim­son, and his aides John J. McCloy, Robert Lovett and Robert B. Ander­son. The lat­ter three wielded para­mount influ­ence in the post­war world of inter­na­tional power pol­i­tics and business.
"A bril­liant Wall Street attor­ney, Stim­son was a man of immense expe­ri­ence who had served in var­i­ous posts for five presidents—Taft, Coolidge, Hoover, Roo­sevelt, Truman—but he was near­ing the end of his extra­or­di­nary career. He knew Manila inti­mately, hav­ing served as governor-general of the Philip­pines in the 1920's. Pres­i­dent Her­bert Hoover had then named him sec­re­tary of State. (Like Hoover, Stim­son thought highly of MacArthur.) By Pearl Har­bor, Stim­son was already in his sev­en­ties. He man­aged his vast wartime respon­si­bil­i­ties by del­e­gat­ing author­ity to four assis­tant sec­re­taries of War: Robert Pat­ter­son, a lawyer and for­mer fed­eral judge; Har­vey Bundy, Boston lawyer and Yale grad­u­ate; and two dynamos Stim­son called his Heav­enly Twins—John McCloy and Robert Lovett. What they all had in com­mon was their close rela­tion­ship to the Har­ri­mans and Rock­e­fellers. Lovett's father had been the right-hand man of rail­way mag­nate E.H. Har­ri­man, who once tried to buy the South Manchurian Rail­way from the Japan­ese. Fol­low­ing in his father's foot­steps, Robert Lovett worked with Averell Har­ri­man at the Wall Street firm of Brown Broth­ers Har­ri­man, han­dling inter­na­tional cur­rency and lend­ing oper­a­tions. John J. McCloy, by con­trast, was a poor boy from Philadel­phia who grad­u­ated from Har­vard Law School, joined the Cra­vath firm on Wall Street, and gained the admi­ra­tion of Averell Har­ri­man by help­ing get $77-million worth of bond issues for the Union Pacific Rail­road. (McCloy engi­neered such deals for every­one from the House of Mor­gan on down.) Work­ing for Sec­re­tary of War Stim­son, Lovett and McCloy became mid­wives at the birth of America's post­war national secu­rity estab­lish­ment, which was closely inter­wo­ven with the finan­cial community."
To read this important work go to Spitfire to read this complete story.

"Oligarchy is the cancer of human history." - Webster Tarpley

The Social Economic Enslavement Of Japan

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